R&D Manipulation under Management Myopia and Performance Balancing Behavior

Abstract

Abstract: This paper investigates whether managers will balance long-term and short-term interests when they manipulate the R&D investment faced with the pressure of loss and profit decline. The results of the paper are as follows: (1)Managers tend to report lower R&D expense to increase profit when they under earnings pressure.(2)The difference is that, under earnings decline pressure, they report unusually high capital expenditures concurrently, and earnings-motivated R&D expense reductions are offset by increases in capital expenditures, which ensures that total investments do not vary in response to earnings decline. Specifically, the resources shifted to capital expenditures are mostly non-R&D capital expenditures rather than capitalized R&D. (3)After controlling other factors, the test of economic consequences shows that the future value of firms under the loss pressure is significantly lower, while the future value of firms under earnings decline pressure is not significantly impaired.

Key words: Earnings Pressure, R&D Manipulation, Capital Expenditures

摘要： 本文检验管理者面临亏损、利润下降的业绩压力时,对R&D投资进行操纵的同时是否还会兼顾长期业绩,结果发现:两类业绩压力下,管理者均倾向于降低费用化的R&D支出数额以提高利润;所不同的是,当企业面临利润下降时,还会增加资本性支出,这使得其总投资并未受到此业绩压力的影响,且增加的资本性支出主要表现为对非R&D活动的投资;对经济后果的检验表明,控制其他因素后,处于亏损压力下的企业未来价值显著较低,而处于利润下降压力中的企业未来价值并未明显折损。

关键词: 业绩压力, R&, D操纵, 资本性支出

CLC Number:

F233

HE Yanan, ZHANG Xindong, HAO Panpan. R&D Manipulation under Management Myopia and Performance Balancing Behavior[J]. , 2019, 35(12): 66-75.

贺亚楠, 张信东, 郝盼盼. 管理者短视下R&D操纵与业绩兼顾行为[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(12): 66-75.

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