Abstract: Securities analysts arean information intermediary between investors and listed companies. Their task is to provide investors with useful information for decision-making and reduce the degree of information asymmetry between investors and listed companies, but the interference of other interests has made the issue of analyst independence controversial. With the expansion of China's equity pledge business, the “credit-debtor” interest relationship between brokers and companies has seriously affected the independence of brokers' analysts. The study finds that if brokerage company has equity pledge business with listed companies, the analysts of the brokerage company will be more optimistic about the company's investment rating, which will reduce analysts' independence. Further research finds that this phenomenon is more serious if the company's information transparency is low, or if the analyst's personal reputation is low. The above conclusions are still robust after DID+PSM is used to control endogeneity problems and other robustness testsare conducted. The findings of this paper have certain reference value for regulating the analyst industry, perfecting the equity pledge policy and improving the efficiency of the capital market.

Key words: Equity Pledge, Analyst Independence, Corporate Information Transparency, Analyst Reputation Mechanism

摘要： 证券分析师为投资者与上市公司间的信息中介,其职能是为投资者提供决策有用的信息,减小投资者与上市公司间的信息不对称程度,但其他利益的干涉使得分析师独立性问题一直饱受争议。随着我国股权质押业务的扩大,券商与公司间的“债权人-债务人”利益关系严重影响了券商旗下分析师的独立性。本文研究发现,若券商与公司有股权质押业务关联,券商旗下分析师对该公司发布的投资评级更偏乐观,使得分析师独立性降低,进一步研究发现,这一现象在信息透明度较低的公司、个人声誉较低的分析师中更为严重。以上结论在DID+PSM控制内生性问题及其他稳健性检验后依旧成立。本文结论对规范分析师行业、完善股权质押政策以及提高资本市场效率具有一定的参考价值。

关键词: 股权质押, 分析师独立性, 公司信息透明度, 分析师声誉