Abstract: By using a dynamic Hotelling Game Model under the asymmetric information,this paper discusses the competition and exclusive dealings behavior within bilateral duopoly platform firms.The results show the equilibrium profit of platform competition depends on the information asymmetry of both sides and the difference of user level in context of the multi-homing ownership.When the levels of buyers are higher than those of the sellers,the platform profit will decrease under asymmetric information,otherwise increase.Platform manufacturers have incentives to implement exclusive dealings under the asymmetric information,which will counteract the positive effect of the platform multi-homing ownership,and reduce the utility level of users.With the enhancement of the price sensitivity of bilateral users,the exclusive dealing motivation between platforms will be decreased,and return to the state of adverse selection and price competition,in which the occupation equilibrium is the pricing discrimination.Therefore,this paper provides useful guidance for platforms'“self-governance” and government regulation in “Internet Plus” economy by using the price competition and exclusive dealings between Tmall and JD as an example.

Key words: Asymmetrical Information, Multi-homing, Platform Competition, Exclusive Dealings, Pricing Discrimination

摘要： 基于不对称信息下,建立动态Hotelling博弈模型,就用户多归属的情形下分析双边市场竞争及其排他性交易后的利润变化。研究结果表明,在用户多归属下,平台竞争的均衡利润变化依赖于双方信息的不对称性和用户水平的差异性。当买方水平高于卖方时,不对称信息下的平台均衡利润是下降的,否则就上升。平台在不对称信息下存在实施排他性交易的动机,不仅抵消用户多归属的正效应,还降低用户的效用水平。随着双边用户的价格敏感度增强,平台排他性交易的实施动机将下降,最后回到逆向选择和价格竞争的状态,其占优均衡是歧视性定价。以天猫和京东两大寡头平台的价格竞争及其排他性交易为例展开阐述,为平台自我治理和政府规制提供有益的指引。

关键词: 不对称信息, 用户多归属, 平台竞争, 排他性交易, 歧视性定价