›› 2020, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (2): 31-41.

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Promotion Incentives for Government Officials and Tax Collection: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Design

YUAN Congshuai1, BAI Yu2, WU Huihang3   

  1. 1.Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences, Beijing 100142, China;
    2.CCB Life Insurance Asset Management Co., Ltd., Shanghai 200120, China;
    3.PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100083, China
  • Received:2019-04-20 Online:2020-02-10 Published:2020-03-20

晋升激励与税收征管——来自断点回归的证据

袁从帅1, 白玉2, 吴辉航3   

  1. 1.中国财政科学研究院,北京 100142;
    2.建信保险资产管理有限公司,上海 200120;
    3.清华大学五道口金融学院,北京 100083
  • 作者简介:袁从帅(1985-),男,山东日照人,中国财政科学研究院博士生;白玉(1991-),女,辽宁阜新人,建信保险资产管理有限公司战略发展部宏观研究员;吴辉航(1991-),男,江西安吉人,清华大学五道口金融学院博士后。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目(19BJY225)

Abstract: Collecting tax by law is the core step to promote the strategy of “Ruling by Law” and an important means to prevent excessive taxation and high tax burden on Chinese enterprises. Based on the databases of Secretary of Municipal Committee of CPC and Chinese industrial enterprises, and using the officials' age as the indicator of promotion incentive, this paper studies the influence of the officials' intervention on the tax collection through the regression discontinuity design. The results show that the probability of promotion drops significantly as the municipal party secretary's age exceeds 53 years old, and the decrease of promotion probability leads to a significant decrease of the effective corporate tax rate by 4.14 percent. Furthermore, this paper studies the heterogeneity of influence from scale, ownership and geographical distribution of the enterprises, and finds that the change of official's promotion incentive exerts more significant effects on large, non-state-owned enterprises in municipal districts. Under the background of tax cuts and legalism of tax revenue, the findings have great practical significance for promoting collecting tax by law and creating a fair and unified tax rule environment.

Key words: Official's Incentive, Tax Collection, Regression Discontinuity Design

摘要: 依法征管是全面推进依法治国的重要环节,是杜绝“过头税”的重要举措。基于市委书记数据库和中国工业企业数据库,本文以官员年龄变化作为晋升激励的衡量指标,利用断点回归方法识别晋升激励对税收征管的影响。研究发现,市委书记在年龄超过53岁之后晋升概率显著下降,对税收绩效的追求降低,从而导致其辖区内企业实际税率显著下降了4.14%;晋升激励对大企业、非国有企业和市辖区企业的征管力度影响更加明显。本文研究对于推进依法征管、营造公平统一的税收法治环境具有重要政策含义。

关键词: 晋升激励, 税收征管, 断点回归

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