[1] 曹和平,唐丽莎. 非银行类金融机构动员金融资源有效性研究[J]. 财经问题研究, 2018, (1) :60-68. [2] Khaled Soufani. On the Determinants of Factoring as a Financing Choice: Evidence from the UK[J]. Journal of Economics and Business,2002,(2):239-252. [3] Fiordelisi,F., Molyneux. Efficiency in the Factoring Industry[J]. Applied Economics,2004,(9):947-959. [4] 张晓健.应收账款保理融资业务探析[J]. 现代管理科学,2012,(2):98-100. [5] 陶凌云.商业保理发展的现状与对策——基于浦东33 家商业保理企业的调查分析[J]. 新金融,2014,(6):18-22. [6] 于辉,马云麟.订单转保理融资模式的供应链金融模型[J]. 系统工程理论与实践,2015,(7):1733-1743. [7] 中国银行业协会保理专业委员会.中国保理产业发展报[R]. 中国银行业协会,2015. [8] Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard in Teams[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13 (2) :323-340. [9] Nalebuff B., J. E. Stiglitz. Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1983, 13: 21-43. [10] Green J., N. Stokey.A Comparison of Tournaments and Contests[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1983, 91: 349-364. [11] BernheimB.D., M.D. Whinston.Common Agency[J]. Econometrica, 1986, 54: 923-942. [12] Dye R.Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1986,17: 339-350. [13] Rogerson W.Repeated Moral Hazard[J]. Econometrica,1985, 53: 69-76. [14] Allen F. Repeated Principal-agent Relationships with Lending and Borrowing[J]. Economic Letters,1985, 17: 27-31. [15] Fudenberg D., B. Holmstrom, P. Milgrom.Short-term Contracts and Long-term Agency Relationships[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1987, 51 (1) :1-31. [16] Holmstrom B, P. Milgrom. Multitask Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Desin[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations,1991, 7 (Special Issue) :24-52. [17] Holmstrom B., P. Milgrom. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J]. Econometrica,1987, 55 (2):303-328. |