[1] 滕飞, 辛宇, 顾小龙. 产品市场竞争与上市公司违规[J]. 会计研究, 2016,(9):32-40. [2] Erickson M., Hanlon M., Maydew E. L. Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2006,44(1):113-143. [3] Khanna V., Kim E. H., Lu Y. CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2015,70(3):1203-1252. [4] Jiang F, Kim K A. Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspective[Z]. Elsevier, 2015. [5] 雷啸, 唐雪松, 郑宇新. 放松卖空管制能抑制上市公司违规吗[J]. 当代财经, 2019,(4):119-130. [6] FASB. Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8[Z]. FASB Norwalk, CT, 2010. [7] De Franco G., Kothari S. P., Verdi R. S. The Benefits of Financial Statement Comparability[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2011,49(4):895-931. [8] 鲁威朝, 杨道广, 刘思义. 会计信息可比性、需求差异与跨公司信息传递[J]. 会计研究, 2019,(4):18-25. [9] Correia M. M. Political Connections, SEC Enforcement and Accounting Quality[M]. California: Stanford University, 2009.17-29. [10] 孟庆斌, 邹洋, 侯德帅. 卖空机制能抑制上市公司违规吗?[J]. 经济研究, 2019,54(6):89-105. [11] Holthausen R. W. Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting Outcomes, and Enforcement[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2009,47(2):447-458. [12] 胥朝阳, 刘睿智. 提高会计信息可比性能抑制盈余管理吗?[J]. 会计研究, 2014,(7):50-57. [13] Kim J., Li L., Lu L. Y., et al. Financial Statement Comparability and Expected Crash Risk[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2016,61(2-3):294-312. [14] 雷啸, 唐雪松, 蒋心怡. 董事高管责任保险能否抑制公司违规行为?[J]. 经济与管理研究, 2020,41(2):127-144. [15] 方军雄. 所有制、市场化进程与资本配置效率[J]. 管理世界, 2007,(11):27-35. [16] 刘启亮, 罗乐, 何威风, 等. 产权性质、制度环境与内部控制[J]. 会计研究, 2012,(3):52-61. [17] 周耀东, 余晖. 国有垄断边界、控制力和绩效关系研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2012,(6):31-43. [18] 黎文靖, 池勤伟. 高管职务消费对企业业绩影响机理研究——基于产权性质的视角[J]. 中国工业经济, 2015,(4):122-134. [19] Cheng Y., Chaudhuri A., Farooq S. Interplant Coordination, Supply Chain Integration, and Operational Performance of a Plant in a Manufacturing Network: A Mediation Analysis[J]. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 2016, 21(5): 550-568. [20] Bradshaw M. T. Analyst Information Processing, Financial Regulation, and Academic Research[J]. The Accounting Review, 2009,84(4):1073-1083. [21] 罗炜, 朱春艳. 代理成本与公司自愿性披露[J]. 经济研究, 2010,45(10):143-155. [22] Wang T. Y., Winton A., Yu X. Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2010,65(6):2255-2292. [23] 陆瑶, 朱玉杰, 胡晓元. 机构投资者持股与上市公司违规行为的实证研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2012,15(1):13-23. [24] Chen G., Firth M., Gao D. N., et al. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Fraud: Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006,12(3):424-448. [25] Roodman D. Fitting Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-process Models with Cmp[J]. The Stata Journal, 2011,11(2):159-206. [26] Francis J. R., Pinnuck M. L., Watanabe O. Auditor Style and Financial Statement Comparability[J]. Accounting Review, 2014,89(2):605-633. [27] 温忠麟, 叶宝娟. 中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J]. 心理科学进展, 2014,22(5):731-745. [28] Huang S., Hilary G. Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2018,56(4):1285-1329. |