Social Trust and Dynamic Adjustment of Cash Holding: Mechanism and Effect of Adjustment——Based on Rent Reeking Theory

Abstract

Abstract: In order to test the degree of dominance of moral restraint and moral hazard of social trust, this paper takes the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as samples to empirically test the effect of social trust on the dynamic adjustment of cash holdings and explore its mechanism and adjustment effect. The findings of the research are as follows: (1) Social trust reduces the speed of dynamic adjustment of cash holdings and increases the degree of cash holding deviation; (2) Analysis of the impact mechanism shows that managers use social trust for rent-seeking, causing moral hazard, and it is difficult to optimize the corporate cash holding structure, thereby weakening the dynamic adjustment of cash holding; (3) In non-state-owned enterprises and companies with insufficient internal governance mechanisms, the relationship between social trust and the speed of dynamic adjustment of cash holding is more significant; (4) Further research on the economic consequences of the dynamic adjustment of cash holdings finds that the greater the deviation of cash holdings, the worse the operating efficiency, which is not conducive to the sustainable and healthy development of the enterprise. This article not only enriches the research on the influencing factors and economic consequences of the dynamic adjustment of cash holdings, but also provides a new explanation from rent-seeking theory for the impact of social trust on the dynamic adjustment of corporate cash holdings in the context of informal institutions.

Key words: Social Trust, Dynamic Adjustment of Cash Holding, Speed of Adjustment, Deviation, Rent Seeking

摘要： 为检验社会信任的道德约束观和道德风险观占优程度,以2007~2017年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为样本,实证检验了社会信任对现金持有动态调整的影响,并深入探究其作用机制与调整效果。研究发现:(1)社会信任降低了现金持有动态调整速度,加大了现金持有偏离程度;(2)管理者会利用社会信任进行寻租,引发道德风险,难以优化企业现金持有结构,从而弱化现金持有动态调整;(3)在非国有企业、内部治理机制不完善的企业中,社会信任降低现金持有动态调整速度更显著;(4)进一步研究动态调整的经济后果发现,现金持有偏离程度越大、经营效率越差,越不利于企业的持续性健康发展。本文丰富了现金持有动态调整的影响因素及经济后果的研究,同时为非正式制度背景下社会信任影响企业现金持有动态调整行为提供了来自寻租理论的新解释。

关键词: 社会信任, 现金持有动态调整, 调整速度, 偏离程度, 寻租

CLC Number:

F253.7

LUO Fuyan, BAN Xu. Social Trust and Dynamic Adjustment of Cash Holding: Mechanism and Effect of Adjustment——Based on Rent Reeking Theory[J]. , 2021, 37(2): 57-67.

罗付岩, 班旭. 社会信任与现金持有动态调整:作用机制与调整效果——基于寻租理论的解释[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(2): 57-67.

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