Abstract: Recently, guarantee by subsidiaries of listed firms is on the increase. This paper empirically analyzes the theoretical logic of this phenomenon. Results show that guarantee by subsidiaries decreases the firm performance and increases two types of agency costs. The results still hold after we differentiate the types of secured parties. Guarantee by subsidiaries mainly increases the agency costs of subsidiaries and does not increase those of listed mother firms. The impact of guarantee of subsidiaries on firm performance is pronounced for small firms, firms located in areas with lower financial market-oriented level and firms at the stage of credit expansion. This paper indicates that guarantee by subsidiaries of listed firms is not based on the real need of listed firms' development, but based on the insiders' self-fulling interests. Through forcing subsidiaries to take the place of listed firms to act as guarantor and leaving agency costs in subsidiaries, corporate insiders can escape from supervision and capital market constraint, and implicitly increase their own interests. This paper provides new evidence for the listed group governance, and has implications for research on guarantee and behavior of subsidiaries.

Key words: Subsidiary Guarantee, Listed Firm, Guarantee, Escaping from Supervision

摘要： 近年来,上市公司子公司对外担保的现象不断增加。本文检验了这一现象背后的理论逻辑。结果发现,在校正了内生性问题后,上市公司子公司对外担保降低了公司绩效,提高了两类代理成本。在区分不同的担保对象后,上述结论依然成立。进一步地,子公司对外担保提高了子公司的代理成本,但并未提高母公司的代理成本。子公司担保降低公司绩效的效果对于规模小的企业、所在地区金融市场化程度低的企业以及信贷扩张阶段的企业而言更强。本文研究结果表明,上市公司子公司对外担保并非出于上市企业集团发展的实际需要,而是出于内部人自利动机的驱动。通过安排子公司出面代替上市公司作为担保方并且将代理成本留在子公司,内部人可以逃避监管和资本市场约束,隐性地增加自身利益。本文提供了上市公司集团治理的新证据,对于信用担保以及子公司行为的研究具有一定的启示。

关键词: 子公司担保, 上市公司, 信用担保, 逃避监管