Abstract:

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2016, this paper studies the impact of the corporate strategy on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between the corporate strategy and the compensation performance sensitivity. The more aggressive the corporate strategy is, the lower the sensitivity of the compensation performance. The conclusion is still valid with the robustness test. Further analysis finds that agency problems and the information quality can significantly affect the relationship between the corporate strategy and the compensation performance sensitivity. That is, the significant negative effect only exists in the group with lower-level corporate governance and poor information quality. Moreover, we find that the more aggressive the corporal strategy is, the more likely the top managers are to receive excess compensation. In summary, this study concludes that the aggressive corporate strategy would facilitate management’s self-interest (obtaining unreasonable compensation), thus reducing the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts.

Key words: Corporate Strategy, Manager Compensation, Compensation Performance Sensitivity

摘要：

本文基于2009~2016年中国A股上市公司数据研究公司战略对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究发现:公司战略与薪酬业绩敏感性存在显著负相关关系,公司战略越激进,薪酬业绩敏感性越低。进一步分析发现,代理问题和信息质量能够显著影响公司战略与薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系,即在公司治理水平较低组以及信息质量较差组,公司战略激进度对薪酬业绩敏感性的负向效应更加显著。此外,公司战略越激进,高管越有可能获得超额薪酬。激进型公司战略会给管理层谋取私利(获得不合理的薪酬)提供便利,降低高管薪酬契约的有效性。

关键词: 公司战略, 高管薪酬, 薪酬业绩敏感性