Abstract: This paper constructs a dynamic game model to analyze the incentives of platformmerchants to manipulate evaluations by implementing the cashback strategy for positive reviews in a competitive market environment, and studies the similarities and differences between the platform autonomy and the government regulation incentives from the perspective of supervision.The research shows that the incentive for merchants to implement the cashback strategy for good reviews gradually decrease with the improvement of their own quality. The higher the quality of the competitors' products, the higher the upper and lower quality thresholds for merchants to implement the favorable cashback strategy, and the quality range narrows as the quality of the competitors' products is enhanced. From the perspective of platform autonomy, when the evaluation influence coefficient is small, the platform has no incentive to govern the cashback strategy, however, when the evaluation influence coefficient is large, the platform starts to manage the cashback strategy. From the perspective of the government regulation, the government can incentivize platforms to carry out stricter regulation by means of “punishment”. Specifically, the government's “punishment” depends on the impact of the evaluation: when the impact is small, the “punishment” should decrease with the improvement of the product quality of the cashback merchants, but increase with the improvement of the quality of the non-cashback merchants; when the impact is big, the “punishment” should increase with the improvement of the product quality of the cashback merchants, and decrease with the improvement of the quality of the non-cashback merchants.

Key words: Cashback Strategy, Dynamic Game, Platform Governance, Government Regulation

摘要： 本文通过构建动态博弈模型,在竞争市场环境下,分析了平台商家通过实施好评返现策略操纵评价的激励,并从监管的角度研究了平台自治和政府管制激励的异同。研究表明,商家实施好评返现策略的激励随自身质量的提升逐渐降低;竞争对手的产品质量越高,商家实施好评返现策略的质量阈值上、下限越大,质量区间随对手产品质量增加而收窄。从平台自治角度出发,在评价影响系数较小时,平台无激励治理好评返现;在评价影响系数较大时,平台开始治理好评返现行为。从政府管制角度出发,政府可通过“惩罚”的方式激励平台进行更严格的管制。具体地,政府“惩罚”力度取决于评价的影响:在影响较小时,“惩罚”应随返现商家产品质量的提高而减小,随未返现商家质量的提高而增大;在影响较大时,“惩罚”应随返现商家产品质量的提高而增大,随未返现商家质量的提高而减小。

关键词: 好评返现, 动态博弈, 平台自治, 政府管制