How does the Digital Economy Affect the Quality of Internal Control

Abstract

Abstract: This study takes the digital economy as the external environment of enterprise operation, makes a theoretical analysis from the two dimensions of agency cost and debt financing, and then conducts an empirical analysis based on the provincial digital economy development index and the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019, so as to explore the impact of the digital economy on the quality of enterprises' internal control and its mechanism. Findings of the study are as follows: First, there is an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the digital economy development index and the quality of enterprises' internal control, and there is a critical point in the digital economy development index. Second, according to the benchmark regression results, the critical value of the digital economy development index is 1.2109. When the regional digital economy development index is lower than 1.2109, the development of the digital economy can improve the quality of the internal control of enterprises. When the index exceeds 1.2109, the further development of the digital economy will reduce the quality of enterprises' internal control. Third, the mechanism of the digital economy affecting the quality of enterprises' internal control lies in the agency cost effect and the debt financing effect of the digital economy. The digital economy can improve the quality of enterprises' internal control by reducing the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, strengthening the audit supervision and reducing the agency cost between shareholders and managers. The quality of the internal control of enterprises can be reduced by promoting the development of the financial technology, reducing the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises, and improving the debt financing level of enterprises.

Key words: Digital Economy, Quality of Enterprise Internal Control, Agency Cost, Debt Financing

摘要： 本文从代理成本和债务融资两个方面展开理论分析,并基于2010—2019年省级数字经济发展指数进行实证检验,研究数字经济对企业内部控制质量的影响及其机制。结果表明,数字经济发展指数与企业内部控制质量之间呈“倒U”型非线性关系。数字经济发展指数对企业内部控制质量的影响存在临界点,低于临界点,数字经济发展可提高企业内部控制质量;越过临界点后,数字经济的持续发展将降低企业内部控制质量。其机制在于数字经济发展具有代理成本效应和债务融资效应,即通过降低信息不对称、强化审计监督降低股东与管理者之间的代理成本,提升企业内部控制质量;通过促进金融科技发展、降低银企信息不对称提高企业债务融资水平,降低企业内部控制质量。

关键词: 数字经济, 企业内部控制质量, 代理成本, 债务融资

CLC Number:

F014.4

CHEN Xiaohui, ZHANG Hongwei, WU Yongchao. How does the Digital Economy Affect the Quality of Internal Control[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(11): 71-80.

陈小辉, 张红伟, 吴永超. 数字经济如何影响企业内部控制质量[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(11): 71-80.

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