Anti-corruption,Energy Investment and Energy Efficiency

Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (12): 103-112.

Anti-corruption,Energy Investment and Energy Efficiency

LIU Jie^1,2, GUO Jianming^1,2, LIU Xiangfeng^2,3

1. School of Public Administration,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China;
2. Government Regulation and Public Policy Research Institute,A New Type of Key Professional Think Tank in Zhejiang Province,Hangzhou 310018,China;
3. China Institute of Regulation Research,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China

Received:2021-04-21 Online:2022-12-10 Published:2022-12-13

反腐败、能源投资和能源效率

刘洁^1,2, 郭剑鸣^1,2, 刘相锋^2,3

1.浙江财经大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州 310018;
2.浙江省新型专业智库“浙江财经大学政府监管与公共政策研究院”,浙江杭州 310018;
3.浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院,浙江杭州 310018

作者简介:刘洁(1981—),女,重庆市人,浙江财经大学公共管理学院讲师,浙江省新型专业智库“浙江财经大学政府监管与公共政策研究院”助理研究员;郭剑鸣(1967—),男,江西吉水人,浙江财经大学公共管理学院教授,浙江省新型专业智库“浙江财经大学政府监管与公共政策研究院”研究员;刘相锋(1985—),男,辽宁鞍山人,浙江省新型专业智库“浙江财经大学政府监管与公共政策研究院”副研究员,浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院副研究员。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重点项目(20AZZ012);国家自然科学基金项目(72003168);浙江省社会科学规划重点项目(21WZQH10Z);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY19G030016)

Abstract

Abstract: In the process of high-quality development of the energy industry, energy corruption has become an important issue. How to improve the energy efficiency through industry integrity has become the focus of the government. Based on this problem, from the perspective of the energy investment, this paper uses the panel data of 30 provinces from 2000 to 2017 to test the impact of corruption on the energy efficiency. The results of the study are as follows: 1) Corruption significantly inhibits the improvement of the energy efficiency; 2) The intermediary effect of the energy investment is significant; 3) Strengthening anti-corruption can better inhibit the negative impact of corruption on the energy investment. Therefore, from the perspective of anti-corruption, this paper provides references for optimizing China's energy investment regulatory mechanisms and further improving the energy efficiency.

Key words: Anti-corruption, Energy Investment, Energy Efficiency, Energy Regulation

摘要： 本文采用2000—2017年30个省份的面板数据,检验腐败对能源效率的影响及其作用机制。研究结果显示,腐败扭曲能源投资并显著抑制了能源效率的提升,加大反腐败力度较好地抑制腐败对能源投资的负面影响。从反腐败的角度,为我国能源投资监管机制优化、能源效率进一步提升给予可借鉴的思路和方法。

关键词: 反腐败, 能源投资, 能源效率, 能源监管

CLC Number:

F402.3

LIU Jie, GUO Jianming, LIU Xiangfeng. Anti-corruption,Energy Investment and Energy Efficiency[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(12): 103-112.

刘洁, 郭剑鸣, 刘相锋. 反腐败、能源投资和能源效率[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(12): 103-112.

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