Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (12): 59-69.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Can “National Team” Shareholdings Curb Firms “from Real to Virtual”? An Analysis on Entity Firms' Financialization

YANG Xingquan, YANG Zheng   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China
  • Received:2022-02-07 Online:2022-12-10 Published:2022-12-13

“国家队”持股能抑制企业“脱实向虚”吗?——实体企业金融化视角

杨兴全, 杨征   

  1. 石河子大学经济与管理学院,新疆 石河子 832000
  • 通讯作者: 杨征(1988—),男,河南内乡人,石河子大学经济与管理学院博士生。
  • 作者简介:杨兴全(1969—),男,甘肃古浪人,石河子大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72062027);财政部“会计名家培养工程”(财会〔2017〕26号);新疆维吾尔自治区研究生教育创新计划项目(XJ2022G093)

Abstract: There is a paradox in the relationship between financial capital and the real economy, therefore, this paper aims to explore the impact of financial capital represented by “national team” on firms' attempt to move “from real to virtual” by taking the exogenous scenario of “national team” entering the market and holding shares for a long time. It provides new perspectives and evidence to identify whether financial capital can promote the development of real economy. This paper argues that the shareholding of “national team” may affect the financialization behavior of firms driven by the “reservoir” motive and the “investment substitution” motive through the effect of risk control and financing promotion and governance optimization, which in turn curb firms “from real to virtual”.
This study uses the data of Chinese A-share firms from 2010 to 2020 and applies the DID model to study the impact of “national team” on real firms' financialization. It is found that “national team” can significantly reduce firms' financialization. The mediation analysis shows that the risk control and the financing promotion path to reduce the operating risk and alleviate financial constraints, the governance optimization path to reduce management expenses and inhibit earnings management are the channels for “national team” to inhibit firms' financialization. It also finds that when the firm is held by CSFC, a state-owned firm or in an area with poor institutional environment, “national team” can more significantly inhibit firms' financialization. In addition, “national team” can promote the firms to go “from virtual to real”, and improve main business investment, R&D investment and innovation output.
The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows: First, this paper provides new perspectives and evidence to identify whether financial capital can have the ability to promote the development of the real economy through causal identification analysis. Second, this paper expands the research on “national teams” and institutional investors from the perspective of long-term institutional governance. Third, this paper expands the study of the factors influencing the financialization of firms from the perspective of government intervention. Fourth, this paper helps to identify the positive effects of “national team” shareholding in promoting the development of real firms, and also has positive implications for the government to optimize the market level, strengthen the supervision of state capital, and promote firms to go “from virtual to real”.

Key words: National Team, Financialization, Corporate Governance, Financial Constraints, Real Economy

摘要: 本文利用2010—2020年中国A股公司数据,通过双重差分模型研究“国家队”长期持股对实体企业金融化的影响。结果发现:“国家队”持股能显著抑制企业金融化。中介效应分析发现,降低经营风险和缓解融资约束的风控促融路径、减少管理费用和抑制盈余管理的治理优化路径,均为“国家队”抑制企业金融化的渠道。进一步研究发现,当企业为证金系持股企业、国有企业或者处于较差制度环境的地区时,“国家队”持股抑制企业金融化的效应更加显著。此外,“国家队”在抑制企业金融化的同时,能积极引导实体企业“脱虚向实”,显著促进主业投资、研发投入和创新产出。

关键词: 国家队, 金融化, 公司治理, 融资约束, 实体经济

CLC Number: