Abstract:

As an important breakthrough in China’s state-owned enterprise reform, the mixed ownership reform is accelerating from the central to the local level. Under the framework of Chinese-style decentralization, what is the motivation of local governments to promote the reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises? How do the various motivations interactwith each other? This paper attempts tousethe Propensity Score Matching andthe Difference-In-Difference Panel Fixed-Effect Model to examine the economic motivation and its relationship with the social motivation of the mixed ownership reform. The findings are as follows: The local mixed ownership reform improves the performance of SOEs, but this economic motivation does not exist in companies with a high degree of monopoly. The performance of local state-owned enterprises is negatively related to the soft budget constraints, and it has a greater impact in monopolistic, high-level management holdings and large-scale state-owned enterprises. Contrary to central enterprises, the non-linear relationship between the economic motivation of the local mixed ownership reform and the social motivation is inverted U-shaped. And it is only significant in monopolies or larger companies.

Key words: Chinese Style Decentralization, Mixed Ownership, Reform Motivation, Local Government

摘要：

本文运用倾向得分匹配法和双重差分面板固定效应模型,实证检验混合所有制改革的经济动机及其与社会动机之间的关系。研究结果发现,地方混合所有制改革提高了国有企业的经营绩效,但这种经济动机在垄断程度较高的企业不存在;地方混合所有制改革的经济效率改善与企业软预算约束呈负相关,且在垄断型、管理层持股较多和规模较大的国有企业中影响更大;与中央企业相反,地方国有企业混合所有制改革的经济动机与社会动机之间存在倒U型的非线性联动关系,且仅在垄断程度较高和规模较大的国有企业中显著。

关键词: 中国式分权, 混合所有制, 改革动机, 地方政府