Abstract:

In 2013, the “Targeted poverty Alleviation” campaign was officially announced. In 2015, China’s Federation of Industry and Commerce launched a new poverty alleviation model of “ten thousand enterprises helping ten thousand villages”. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)and other departments coordinated and introduced many policies and measures to mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprises in targeted poverty alleviation. Market-oriented targeted poverty alleviation with the participation of a large number of enterprises began to develop rapidly, becoming an important supplement to government-led targeted poverty alleviation. Enterprises participate in precise poverty alleviation as one of the main methods of its social responsibility performance, which gives them various influence. This paper mainly investigates how the enterprise accurate poverty alleviation affects the government subsidies as a core problem, while discussing the role of the executive poverty and academic experience in the enterprise decision for poverty alleviation.
The study finds that the probability or intensity of enterprises’ participation in targeted poverty alleviation increases when senior executives had poverty experience, academic experience, or both experience. Specifically, the probability of senior executives with poverty experience participating in targeted poverty alleviation is 5.81% higher than that of senior executives without poverty experience, and the probability of senior executives with academic experience participating in targeted poverty alleviation is 7.95% higher than that of senior executives without academic experience. When senior executives have both poverty experience and academic experience, the probability of their enterprises participating in targeted poverty alleviation is 9.32% higher than that of other enterprises. Enterprises participating in targeted poverty alleviation are more likely to receive government subsidies. That is, the higher the intensity of targeted poverty alleviation, the greater the intensity of government subsidies will be. Specifically, the probability of enterprises participating in targeted poverty alleviation receiving government subsidies is 59.6% higher than that of enterprises not participating in targeted poverty alleviation. Every 1% increase in targeted poverty alleviation intensity of enterprises will be followed by the corresponding increase of government subsidy intensity of 0.305%. Heterogeneity analysis shows that loss-making enterprises participating in targeted poverty alleviation can obtain more government subsidies, both in terms of probability of obtaining subsidies and in terms of intensity of obtaining subsidies. The probability of loss-making enterprises receiving government subsidies is 70.9% higher than that of non-loss-making enterprises, while the probability of non-loss-making enterprises receiving government subsidies is only 31.3%. If the targeted poverty alleviation intensity of loss-making enterprises increases by 1%, the intensity of government subsidies will increase by 0.242% correspondingly, while that of non-loss-making enterprises is only 0.064%. Compared with state-owned enterprises, private enterprises’ participation in targeted poverty alleviation plays a greater role in promoting their access to government subsidies. Specifically, private enterprises participating in targeted poverty alleviation were 98.7% more likely to receive government subsidies than those not participating in targeted poverty alleviation, while the probability of state-owned enterprises receiving government subsidies was 77.8%. When the intensity of targeted poverty alleviation is increased by 1%, the intensity of government subsidy for private enterprises will increase by 0.464%, while that for state-owned enterprises is only 0.105%.
Using two-stage least square method (2SLS), propensity score matching method (PSM)and other methods to solve the possible endogeneity problems, and various robustness tests, we show that the conclusion is still valid and robust. This study has some implications for both government and enterprises. For the government, establishing the marketization of enterprises to participate in systems and mechanisms for poverty alleviation is necessary. So is building open, transparent and efficient competition mechanism to identify enterprises who are enthusiastic in poverty alleviation enterprises identified. At the same time, the government can also improve and implement the enterprise support and reward policy for poverty alleviation, industry support and preferential tax breaks, and so on, making enterprises involved in poverty alleviation feel that public welfare activities generates counter effects. For enterprises, participating in targeted poverty alleviation not only is one of the important ways to fulfill their social responsibilities, but also can promote enterprise development with the help of national policies, tax incentives, and government subsidies, which can be described as a win-win move.

Key words: Targeted Poverty Alleviation, Government Subsidies, Executive Experience

摘要：

企业参与的市场化扶贫是精准扶贫事业顺利收官的重要补充,而建立起良性的政企互动机制则是必要的制度安排。本文利用2016—2019年企业精准扶贫和政府补助数据,以高管经历为切入视角,探讨了企业参与精准扶贫如何影响其获得政府补助这一问题。研究发现,当企业高管有贫困经历或有学术经历或两种经历兼有时,所在企业参与精准扶贫的概率或强度增大。同时,企业参与精准扶贫对其获得政府补助有显著的正向促进作用,即参与精准扶贫的企业获得政府补助的概率和强度都有明显提高,其中亏损企业、民营企业受到的影响程度更为明显。内生性问题讨论以及多种稳健性检验均表明结论依然稳健可靠。

关键词: 企业精准扶贫, 政府补助, 高管经历