Abstract:

This paper studies the impact of comment letters issued by stock exchanges on independent directors’ dissent regarding corporate decisions from 2015 to 2018. It is found that independent directors are more likely to express their dissenting opinion after receiving inquiry letters from stock exchanges. But independent directors have no tendency to dissent from corporate decisions when the inquiry letters require them to reply explicitly. By examining the different effects between three types of inquiry letters, the paper concludes that the concern inquiry letters and the financial reporting inquiry letters have made independent directors dissent from corporate decisions more easily, while the acquisition and merger inquiry letters have exerted the opposite effect. Further research finds that independent directors have greater tendency to express dissent in companies with lower shareholding ratio of the institutional investors or higher negative emotion of the media as well as in non-state-owned firms.

Key words: Inquiry Letter, Independent Directors, Dissent Behavior, Institutional Investors’ Share-holding

摘要：

基于沪深两市证券交易所2015至2018年发放的问询函,研究交易所问询函监管对独立董事发表异议行为的影响。实证结果表明,企业收到交易所问询函后,独立董事更有可能发表异议。但是,当问询函中明确要求独立董事回复时,没有促使独立董事更倾向于发表异议。通过对不同类型的问询函监管效果进行检验发现,独立董事在企业收到关注函和定期报告类问询函后更容易出具异议意见,而收到并购重组类问询函会减少独立董事发表异议的倾向。更进一步研究表明,问询函监管在机构投资者持股比例较低、媒体负面情绪较高以及非国有企业中更能促使独立董事发表异议。

关键词: 问询函监管, 独立董事, 异议行为, 机构投资者持股