Research on Structural Presumption in Digital Platform Merger Control Policy

Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (6): 103-112.

Research on Structural Presumption in Digital Platform Merger Control Policy

TANG Yaojia¹, LIN Zipeng²

1. School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China;
2. China Institute of Regulaton Research, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2021-07-10 Online:2022-06-10 Published:2022-06-09

数字平台并购控制的“结构推定”研究

唐要家¹, 林梓鹏²

1.浙江财经大学经济学院,浙江杭州 310018;
2.浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院,浙江杭州 310018

作者简介:唐要家(1971—),男,辽宁瓦房店人,浙江财经大学经济学院教授;林梓鹏(1981—),男,广东揭阳人,浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院博士生,广东省电信规划设计院高级工程师。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重点项目(19AJY004)

Abstract

Abstract: The “structural review” is a basic measure for themerger control. Weakening of the structural review will increase the risk of under-enforcement in the merger control. As the digital economy market has a higher concentration trend and sustainability monopoly power, structural presumptions should be strengthened to prohibit mergers that significantly lessen thecompetition. China's Merger control policy does not introduce the structural presumption and establish a quantitative structural review threshold, which is not conducive to the effective control of anti-competitive mergers. As a result, it is necessary to strengthen the structural review and adoptthe “structural presumption”, clarify the quantitative criteria for the structural threshold, and improve the efficiency defense procedure.

Key words: Digital Platform, Merger Control Policy, Structure Review, Structural Presumption, Anti-monopoly

摘要： “结构审查”是反垄断并购控制的基础措施,结构审查的结构推定弱化会增加并购控制反垄断执法失效的风险。由于数字经济具有内在的高集中市场趋势和强可维持市场势力,面对数字平台的扩张性并购和竞争损害风险,我们应强化结构推定审查,以维护市场竞争。目前,我国反垄断并购控制政策没有引入“结构推定”并建立量化的结构审查标准,结构审查的模糊性和宽松适用降低了并购控制政策的有效性。因此,数字平台并购控制政策应强化结构审查和引入“结构推定”,明确企业并购结构审查的量化标准并完善效率抗辩程序保障。

关键词: 数字平台, 并购控制政策, 结构审查, 结构推定, 反垄断

CLC Number:

D923.42

TANG Yaojia, LIN Zipeng. Research on Structural Presumption in Digital Platform Merger Control Policy[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(6): 103-112.

唐要家, 林梓鹏. 数字平台并购控制的“结构推定”研究[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(6): 103-112.

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