Abstract: High-quality development is the primary task of building a modern socialist country in an all-round way. As an important material and political foundation of socialism with Chinese characteristics, state-owned enterprises(SOEs) are also the main force of China's economic system reform, and mixed ownership reform is a key measure to promote the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises. By combing the institutional background and policy practice of SOEs reform, this paper puts forward the hypothesis of resource allocation effect induced by SOEs reform and its mechanism, and empirically tests it based on the micro data of Chinese industrial enterprises.
Since the reform and opening up, the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises (referred to as state-owned enterprise reform or state-owned enterprise reform) has been an important part of the development and improvement of the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. The reform of state-owned enterprises has successively gone through the stage of delegating power and giving profits and expanding the right to operate independently in the early stage of reform and opening up, the stage of building a modern enterprise system with the reform of the property rights system as the core and "grasping the big and letting go of the small" in the 90s of the 20th century, the stage of institutional innovation with the reform of the state-owned asset management system as the core in the early 21st century, and the stage of comprehensively deepening the reform of state-owned assets and state-owned enterprises since the new era. In particular, since the new era, the reform of state-owned enterprises has entered a stage of comprehensive deepening, and the goal of state-owned enterprise reform has been clarified to form an asset management system, a modern enterprise system, and a market-oriented operation mechanism that meet the requirements of China's basic economic system and the development of the socialist market economy, and the layout of state-owned capital is more reasonable. The reform of state-owned enterprises played an important role in the smooth operation of the economy after the 2008 financial crisis, and the number of state-owned enterprises was basically maintained at about 20000, accounting for about 5% of the industrial sector, contributing 40% of assets and 25% of industrial output.
This paper examines the resource allocation effect of SOEs reform from three aspects: before and after the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, restructured state-owned enterprises and dis-restructured state-owned enterprises, and restructured state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, and describes the resource allocation effect by measuring the changes and differences of the two core variables of total factor productivity and market share of enterprises. The empirical results based on the micro data of Chinese industrial enterprises show that the mixed ownership reform promotes the productivity and market share of state-owned enterprises, and the productivity of restructured state-owned enterprises is significantly higher than that of dis-restructured state-owned enterprises, and at the same time realizes the process of resetting resources from state-owned enterprises to restructured state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, and optimizes the allocation efficiency of factor resources among enterprises.
The mechanism analysis of this paper shows that the reason why the reform of state-owned enterprises has brought about the above effect of improving resource allocation is mainly through four aspects of the mechanism, namely: reducing the distortion of factor markets biased towards state-owned enterprises, eliminating unnecessary administrative monopolies and industry barriers, improving the equity structure and corporate governance of state-owned enterprises to alleviate financing constraints, stripping state-owned enterprises of policy burdens, and realizing benign flow and rational allocation of resources.
This paper takes the resource allocation effect caused by the reform of state-owned enterprises as the research theme, and the innovation points are mainly reflected in:First, by sorting out the institutional background and policy practice of state-owned enterprise reform, the theoretical framework and research hypothesis of the resource allocation effect caused by state-owned enterprise reform are proposed from four aspects: factor market distortion, administrative monopoly, financing constraint and policy burden, so as to supplement and expand the research propositions related to state-owned enterprise reform; Second, from the empirical test research hypothesis of three dimensions before and after the reform of state-owned enterprises, restructured state-owned enterprises and dis-restructured state-owned enterprises, and restructured state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, the mechanism analysis is carried out at the micro and industry level of enterprises, which enriches the empirical paradigm of state-owned enterprise reform; Third, the research conclusion has certain theoretical support and reference value for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, releasing the policy dividends and institutional advantages of state-owned enterprise reform, better serving the real economy, and promoting high-quality economic development.
The policy enlightenment of this paper lies in the profound understanding that the reform of state-owned enterprises aims to improve the socialist market economic system and clarify the boundary between the government and the market to achieve optimal allocation of resources. To this end, we must adhere to the guidance of "managing capital", unswervingly deepen the reform of state-owned assets and state-owned enterprises, stimulate the market vitality of state-owned enterprises, enhance the core competitiveness of state-owned enterprises, rely on market mechanisms to improve the operational efficiency of state-owned capital, guide the optimal allocation of state-owned capital, better serve the real economy, and help China's high-quality economic development.

Key words: SOEs, Mixed Ownership Reform, Resource Allocation, Total Factor Productivity, Government and Market

摘要： 本文通过梳理国有企业改革的制度背景和政策实践,提出国企改革引致的资源配置效应,并从国企改制前后、改制国企与未改制国企、改制国企与非国有企业三个维度进行实证分析。研究发现,混合所有制改革提升国有企业的全要素生产率和市场份额,改制国企的全要素生产率显著高于未改制国企,实现资源从国有企业向改制国企和非国有企业的重置,优化要素资源在企业间的配置效率。机制分析表明,国有企业改革通过减轻要素市场扭曲、消除行政性垄断、缓解融资约束、剥离政策性负担来实现资源配置效应。上述研究对深化国有企业改革、更好服务实体经济,助力经济高质量发展具有一定的理论支撑和参考价值。

关键词: 国有企业, 混合所有制改革, 资源配置, 全要素生产率, 政府与市场