Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2023, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (11): 69-80.

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The Supervision and Governance Effect of Multiple Large Shareholders: Evidence from Corporate Fraud

XIONG Lingyun, FANG Yuan, YANG Lijuan   

  1. School of Accounting, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China
  • Received:2022-09-15 Online:2023-11-10 Published:2023-11-09

多个大股东的监督治理效应——来自企业违规的经验证据

熊凌云, 方远, 杨李娟   

  1. 江西财经大学会计学院,江西 南昌 330013
  • 通讯作者: 杨李娟(1990—),女,云南大理人,江西财经大学会计学院助理研究员
  • 作者简介:熊凌云(1988—),男,江西南昌人,江西财经大学会计学院副教授;方远(1998—),男,江西九江人,江西财经大学会计学院硕士生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金青年项目(23CJY034);江西省教育厅科学技术研究项目(GJJ2200506);江西省学位与研究生教育教学改革研究项目(JXYJG-2020-086)

Abstract: This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as samples to examine the economic effects of multiple large shareholders in corporate violations. It is found that multiple large shareholders effectively inhibit corporate violations, which is reflected in the supervisory governance effect of multiple large shareholders. Mechanism and path analysis shows that the influence mechanism of multiple large shareholders to curb corporate fraud is information supervision and collaborative governance, and the specific path is achieved by appointing directors and issuing withdrawal threats. Heterogeneity analysis finds that the higher the degree of supervisory governance and the more stable the shareholding of multiple large shareholders, the stronger the inhibitory effect on corporate fraud; Multiple large shareholders can reduce information disclosure fraud and operation fraud, and also have an important inhibitory effect on violation tendency, but the effect on violation auditing is not significant. In addition, multiple large shareholders also enhance the market value and long-term financial performance of firms by suppressing corporate violations and reduce future business risks. Therefore, both regulatory authorities and listed companies should pay attention to the governance role of multiple large shareholders, and create a good internal and external environment for multiple large shareholders to exert their supervisory governance effect, thereby reducing corporate fraud and promoting high-quality corporate development.

Key words: Multiple Large Shareholders, Corporate Fraud, Information Supervision, Collaborative Governance

摘要: 本文以2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察多个大股东在企业违规方面发挥的经济效应。研究发现,多个大股东有效抑制了企业违规,体现为多个大股东的监督治理效应。机制和路径分析表明,多个大股东抑制企业违规的影响机制是信息监督和协同治理,具体路径是通过委派董事和退出威胁实现的。异质性分析表明,多个大股东监督治理程度越高、持股越稳定,对企业违规的抑制作用越强;多个大股东可以降低信息披露违规和经营违规,对违规倾向也有重要抑制作用,但对违规稽查的影响不显著。此外,多个大股东通过抑制企业违规还提升了企业的市场价值和长期财务业绩表现,降低了未来经营风险。因此,监管部门和上市公司应为多个大股东监督治理效应的发挥营造良好的内外部环境,进而减少企业违规,促进企业高质量发展。

关键词: 多个大股东, 企业违规, 信息监督, 协同治理

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