Government Contingent Liability of China's State-controlled Listed Company:A Size Measurement

Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2023, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (3): 25-34.

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Government Contingent Liability of China's State-controlled Listed Company:A Size Measurement

SHEN Liang¹, CHEN Yuanyuan¹, WANG Xiaotong¹, WANG Yuyan²

1. School of Public Finance and Taxation, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China;
2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China

Received:2022-05-16 Online:2023-03-10 Published:2023-03-13

源于我国国有控股上市公司的政府或有债务——一个规模测度

申亮¹, 陈媛媛¹, 王晓彤¹, 王玉燕²

1.山东财经大学财政税务学院,山东济南 250014;
2.山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山东济南 250014

作者简介:申亮(1974—),男,河北邯郸人,山东财经大学财政税务学院教授,博士;陈媛媛(1993—),女,山东枣庄人,山东财经大学财政税务学院博士生;王晓彤(1996—),女,山东泰安人,山东财经大学财政税务学院硕士;王玉燕(1978—),女,山东德州人,山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院教授,博士。
基金资助:
山东省泰山学者工程专项青年专家项目(tsqn202211197);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71971129);国家社科规划一般项目(21BJY003)。

Abstract

Abstract: Taking the state-controlled listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2020 as the research object, this paper designs an index to measure the scale of the government contingent debts of China's state-controlled listed companies. Firstly, the correlation of the predicament of listed companies in the same industry is obtained according to the correlation coefficient matrix, and then the KMV model is used to analyze and calculate the probability of each company getting into trouble. Based on this, the expected and unexpected costs borne by the government are calculated and the scale of the government contingent liabilities derived from the state-owned listed companies is finally obtained. This approach not only takes into account the differences in government guarantees for enterprises in different industries, but also takes into consideration the impact of interconnectedness among enterprises in the same industry. The analysis of the final empirical results shows that the government's guarantee and aid to the state-controlled listed companies will produce a large number of contingent debts, which reached between 634. 32 billion yuan and 744.64 billion yuan in 2020. In order to relieve the severe financial pressure caused by huge contingent debts and reduce the risk of government debts, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to restrict the government's guarantee behavior to state-controlled listed companies and reduce the scale of the contingent debts from this source according to the relationship of variables in the model.

Key words: Government Contingent Debt, State Holding-controlled Listed Company, Expected Cost, Unexpected Cost

摘要： 本文以2011—2020年沪深A股国有控股上市公司为研究对象,设计一个测算我国国有控股上市公司的政府或有债务规模指标。首先根据相关系数矩阵得到同行业内各国有控股上市公司的困境关联性,再使用KMV模型分析并测算出各公司陷入困境的概率,基于此计算出政府承担的预期成本和非预期成本,最终获得2011—2020年源于国有控股上市公司的政府或有债务的规模。这种方法不仅考虑了政府对不同行业企业的担保差异,还将同一行业内各企业之间关联性的影响纳入其中。实证结果表明:政府对国有控股上市公司的担保救助行为会产生大量的或有债务,2020年其水平已在6343.2亿元至7446.4亿元之间。为了减轻巨额或有债务带来的严重财政压力、降低政府债务风险,本文依据模型中的变量关系,针对性地提出了约束政府对国有控股上市公司的担保救助行为、减少该来源或有债务规模的政策建议。

关键词: 政府或有债务, 国有控股上市公司, 预期成本, 非预期成本

CLC Number:

F812.5

SHEN Liang, CHEN Yuanyuan, WANG Xiaotong, WANG Yuyan. Government Contingent Liability of China's State-controlled Listed Company:A Size Measurement[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2023, 39(3): 25-34.

申亮, 陈媛媛, 王晓彤, 王玉燕. 源于我国国有控股上市公司的政府或有债务——一个规模测度[J]. 财经论丛, 2023, 39(3): 25-34.

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Government Contingent Liability of China's State-controlled Listed Company:A Size Measurement

源于我国国有控股上市公司的政府或有债务——一个规模测度

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