Abstract: The external supervision effect of D&O liability insurance can help to alleviate agency conflicts and thus reduce corporate financialization, but it may also play an opportunistic effect and lead to the reduction of management's self-interest cost, thus exacerbating corporate financialization. Therefore, this paper examines the influence of D&O liability insurance purchase by listed companies on corporate financialization with Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as the sample. The study finds that D&O liability insurance intensifies corporate financialization, and the positive relationship between D&O liability insurance and corporate financialization is more significant with the increase of opportunism motivation. This supports the opportunism effect. Further analysis shows that the positive correlation between D&O liability insurance and corporate financialization is significant only in state-owned enterprises and enterprises with low level of external governance. When the opportunism motivation of the management is strong, the enhanced financialization of D&O liability insurance has a significant inhibiting effect on enterprises' innovation and total factor productivity.

Key words: D&O Liability Insurance, Financialization, Opportunistic Motives

摘要： 董事高管责任保险能发挥外部监督效应,有助于缓解代理冲突,减少企业金融化,但同时也可能发挥机会主义效应,导致管理层自利成本降低,从而加剧企业金融化。为此,本文以2010—2020年中国A股上市企业为样本,检验了董事高管责任保险对企业金融化的影响。研究发现,董事高管责任保险加剧了企业金融化,且随着管理层自利动机的增强,二者的正向关系更显著,这支持了机会主义效应。进一步分析表明,董事高管责任保险与企业金融化的正相关关系仅在国有企业和外部治理水平较低的企业中显著。当管理层自利动机较强时,董事高管责任保险提升金融化后,对企业创新和全要素生产率产生了显著的抑制作用。

关键词: 董事高管责任保险, 企业金融化, 机会主义动机