Abstract: Using Chinese non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2020 as samples, this paper explores the relationship between management's online interactive platform information disclosure and auditor's pricing strategy. The findings of the study are as follows: (1)The higher the level of interaction on the online platform, the lower the level of auditor pricing. Timeliness of management responses and text relevance both positively moderate the negative relationship. (2)The channel of action test shows that online platform interaction reduces auditor pricing by mitigating the “risk premium mechanism” rather than the “cost compensation mechanism”. (3)The expansionary analysis part mainly examines the information types of the online exchange platform interaction that auditors are concerned about. Specifically, the disclosure of risk information, the internal competition culture and R&D text information can reduce the auditor's pricing level, thus verifying the convergence view of risk information, the supervision effect of the competition culture and the information increment effect of R&D text information. The findings enrich the information set actually obtained by auditors for decision making from the perspective of online platform interaction and provide feasible ideas and references for auditors to assess corporate material misstatement risks and set reasonable fees.

Key words: Network Platform Interaction, Management Response Quality, Timeliness of Management Responses, Text Relevance, Auditor Pricing

摘要： 本文以2010—2020年中国沪深A股非金融上市公司为样本,探讨管理层网络互动平台信息披露与审计师定价策略之间的关系。研究发现,网络平台互动程度越高,审计师定价水平越低。管理层回复及时性和文本相关性均能够正向调节两者负向关系。作用渠道检验表明,网络平台互动主要通过缓解“风险溢价机制”而非“成本补偿机制”来降低审计师定价水平。进一步的拓展性分析发现,上市公司风险信息、内部竞争文化和研发文本信息的披露能够降低审计师定价水平,验证了风险信息的趋同观、竞争文化的监督效应以及研发文本信息的信息增量效应。本文研究结论从网络平台互动的角度丰富了审计师实际获得的决策信息集,为审计师评估企业重大错报风险、制定合理的收费标准提供了可行的思路和参考。

关键词: 网络平台互动, 管理层回复质量, 回复及时性, 文本相关性, 审计师定价