Abstract: Based on a systematic interpretation of the logical mechanism by which local government competition acts on government debt expansion through urban sprawl, the article examines the relationship between local government debt expansion and government competition using the panel data of 265 cities from 2006 to 2019. The study finds that local government competition significantly increases the size and the probability of issuance of municipal bonds, with the effect being more pronounced in cities with population outflows. The mechanism analysis shows that local government competition will aggravate the low density and the decentralized spread of urban space, which will weaken the scale effect of cities and increase the expenditure of infrastructure construction and maintenance, forcing local governments to finance with debt, which will lead to the expansion of local government debt. Furthermore, through the analysis of spatial econometric model, it is found that the urban sprawl caused by competition among local governments has significantly stimulated the expansion of local government debt in both the city itself and the neighboring cities. This paper proposes policy recommendations for preventing and resolving government debt risks by examining the mechanisms by which urban sprawl affects the expansion of government debt in the process of local government competition.

Key words: Local Government Competition, Urban Sprawl, Local Government Debt

摘要： 本文在系统诠释地方政府竞争通过城市蔓延作用于政府债务扩张的逻辑机理基础上,利用2006—2019年265个城市面板数据,考察了地方政府债务扩张与政府竞争间的关系。研究发现地方政府竞争显著提高了城投债的发行规模和发行概率,该影响在人口流出城市更为显著。机制分析表明地方政府竞争会加剧城市空间的低密度和分散化蔓延,引起城市规模效应减弱和基础设施建设与维护费用支出增加,迫使地方政府以债融资,从而带来地方政府债务扩张。进一步通过空间计量模型分析发现,地方政府间竞争引致的城市蔓延显著刺激了城市自身及邻近城市的政府债务扩张。本文通过研究城市蔓延在地方政府竞争对政府债务扩张过程中的影响机制,为防范化解政府债务风险提出政策建议。

关键词: 地方政府竞争, 城市蔓延, 地方政府债务