Research on the Influence of Directors' and Officers' Liability on Excess Goodwill

Abstract

Abstract: In recent years, the issue of high-premium mergers and acquisitions and the huge amounts of goodwill impairment has gradually attracted the attention of investors in the capital market. This issue has also become one of the important financial risk factors on a global scale. The scale of goodwill in China's capital market is huge, and the problem of large amounts of goodwill impairment frequently occurs, which adds risks to the capital market and cause systematic financial risks. As an emerging external governance tool, D&O insurance is expected to affect managers' confirmation of excess goodwill. Based on this, this article uses the data of China's non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2007 to 2019 to empirically test the impact of D&O insurance on excess goodwill. The research results of this article are as follows: D&O insurance can significantly suppress excess goodwill; D&O insurance suppresses excess goodwill mainly through the improvement of the internal control quality; As an external supervision mechanism, D&O insurance has a more significant effect on excess goodwill when a firm does not hire Big Four audit firms to audit its annual reports, has few analysts following or has a lower percentage of institutional investors' ownership.

Key words: D&, O Insurance, Excess Goodwill, Internal Control, External Supervision

摘要： 我国资本市场商誉规模庞大、频繁发生计提巨额商誉减值的问题,给正常的资本市场秩序埋下重大隐患。而D&O保险作为新兴的外部治理工具,预期会影响管理者在并购过程中对超额商誉的确认。本文使用2007—2019年中国沪深A股非金融行业上市公司的数据,实证检验D&O保险对超额商誉的影响。研究发现:D&O保险发挥监督效应,能够显著降低超额商誉;D&O保险对超额商誉的抑制通过提高内部控制质量得以实现; D&O保险作为外部监督补偿机制,在外部监督较弱(非国际四大或国内十大审计、分析师跟踪人数少、机构投资者持股比例低)的情况下,对超额商誉的抑制作用更加显著。

关键词: D&, O保险, 超额商誉, 内部控制, 外部监督

CLC Number:

F275.5

LI Guowei, LI Wenxiang. Research on the Influence of Directors' and Officers' Liability on Excess Goodwill[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2023, 39(7): 79-88.

厉国威, 励雯翔. 董事高管责任保险对超额商誉的影响[J]. 财经论丛, 2023, 39(7): 79-88.

References

[1]Ramanna K. The Implications of Unverifiable Fair-value Accounting: Evidence from the Political Economy of Goodwill Accounting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2008, 45(23): 253-281.
[2]郭照蕊, 黄俊. 高质量审计与上市公司商誉泡沫[J]. 审计研究, 2020, (4): 80-89.
[3]宋佳宁, 高闯. 实际控制人所有权能否抑制商誉泡沫?——基于内部控制视角的解释[J]. 财贸研究, 2021, (4): 98-110.
[4] Core J. E. On the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1997, 64(1): 63-87.
[5]胡国柳, 赵阳, 胡珺. D&O保险、风险容忍与企业自主创新[J]. 管理世界, 2019, (8): 121-135.
[6]Mayers D., C. W. Smith. On the Corporate Demand for Insurance[J]. Journal of Business, 1982, 55 (2) : 281-296.
[7]Priest G. L. The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law[J]. The Yale Law Journal, 1987, 96: 1521-1590.
[8]赖黎, 唐芸茜, 夏晓兰, 等. 董事高管责任保险降低了企业风险吗?——基于短贷长投和信贷获取的视角[J]. 管理世界, 2019, (10): 160-171.
[9]胡国柳, 胡珺. 董事高管责任保险与公司绩效——基于中国A股上市公司的经验分析[J]. 经济评论, 2014, (5): 136-147.
[10]赵杨, John Hu. 董事及高管责任保险: 激励还是自利?基于中国上市公司的实证检验[J]. 中国软科学, 2014, (9): 147-164.
[11]袁蓉丽, 王群, 夏圣洁. 董事高管责任保险与增发费用[J]. 中国软科学, 2019, (6): 107-117.
[12]李从刚, 许荣. 保险治理与公司违规——董事高管责任保险的治理效应研究[J]. 金融研究, 2020, (6): 188-206.
[13]Chung H. H., J. P. Wynn. Managerial Legal Liability Coverage and Earnings Conservatism[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2008, 46(1): 135-153.
[14]胡国柳, 赵阳. 公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理[J]. 财经理论与实践, 2017, (2): 74-80.
[15]李丹蒙, 叶建芳, 卢思绮, 等. 管理者过度自信、产权性质与并购商誉[J]. 会计研究, 2018, (10): 50-57.
[16]何丽娜. 管理者能力与商誉泡沫的抑制[D]. 呼和浩特:内蒙古大学, 2020.
[17]张新民, 卿琛, 杨道广. 内部控制与商誉泡沫的抑制——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2018, (3): 55-65.
[18]许罡. 企业社会责任履行抑制商誉泡沫吗?[J]. 审计与经济研究, 2020, (1): 90-99.
[19]傅超, 杨曾, 傅代国. “同伴效应”影响了企业的并购商誉吗?——基于我国创业板高溢价并购的经验证据[J]. 中国软科学, 2015, (11): 94-108.
[20]杨威, 宋敏, 冯科. 并购商誉、投资者过度反应与股价泡沫及崩盘[J]. 中国工业经济, 2018, (6): 156-173.
[21]魏志华, 朱彩云. 超额商誉是否成为企业经营负担——基于产品市场竞争能力视角的解释[J]. 中国工业经济, 2019, (11): 174-192.
[22]徐玉德, 洪金明. 商誉减值计提动机及其外部审计监管——来自A股市场的经验证据[A]. 中国会计学会. 商誉会计研讨会论文集[C]. 北京: 中国会计学会, 2010. 11.
[23]郑志刚, 许荣, 徐向江, 等. 公司章程条款的设立、法律对投资者权力保护和公司治理——基于我国A股上市公司的证据[J]. 管理世界, 2011, (7): 141-153, 187-188.
[24]袁蓉丽, 文雯, 谢志华. 董事高管责任保险和财务报表重述[J]. 会计研究, 2018, (5): 21-27.
[25]Baker T., S. J. Griffith. Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Market[J]. The University of Chicago Law Review, 2006, 74(2): 1795-1854.
[26]郑海英, 刘正阳, 冯卫东. 并购商誉能提升公司业绩吗?——来自A股上市公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2014, (3): 11-17, 95.
[27]石青梅, 徐涵, 孙梦娜. 超额商誉是否引起审计关注？——基于关键审计事项披露的研究视角[J]. 金融发展研究, 2021, (5): 31-38.
[28]刘斌, 付景涛, 胡国柳. 董事高管责任保险、产权与内部控制构建[J]. 科研管理, 2021, (7): 171-178.
[29]郑建明, 黄晓蓓, 张新民. 管理者业绩预告违规与分析师监管[J]. 会计研究, 2015, (3): 50-56, 95.
[30]蔡宏标, 饶品贵. 机构投资者、税收征管与企业避税[J]. 会计研究, 2015, (10): 59-65, 97.