Abstract: As the important mechanism of internal governance, the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders will have a significant impact on the comparability of accounting information. Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020, this paper empirically tests the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on the comparability of accounting information. It is found that the threat of exit of non-controlling large shareholders has significantly improved the comparability of accounting information of listed companies. The exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders has a more significant impact on the comparability of accounting information in enterprises that are non-state-owned, have a high credibility of the exit threat, have no appointed directors, supervisors or senior managers, have less attention from analysts and face high environmental uncertainty. The mechanism test shows that the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders mainly improves the comparability of accounting information by suppressing the agency problem of the management. The economic consequence test finds that the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders promotes the comparability of accounting information and increases the enterprise value.
The research results of the paper confirm the governance role of the non-controlling large shareholders' exit threat, and provide new enlightenment for the expansion of corporate information governance channels. Enterprises should pay more attention to and give full play to the corporate governance role of non-controlling large shareholders, further promote the reform of the equity structure, highlight the equity balance and its governance effect, protect the reasonable right to know and the participation of non-controlling large shareholders, and create a better internal environment for strengthening corporate governance. At the same time, internal and external coordination is needed to further improve the external resource allocation, government supervision and other market environment while optimizing the internal equity structure and the governance environment, so as to effectively protect the interests of investors and promote the high-quality development of the market.

Key words: Non-controlling Large Shareholder, Exit Threat, Comparability of Accounting Information

摘要： 本文基于2007—2020年A股上市公司样本,实证检验了非控股大股东退出威胁对会计信息可比性的影响。研究发现,非控股大股东退出威胁显著提升了上市公司会计信息可比性。机制分析表明,非控股大股东退出威胁在非国有、退出威胁可信性高、无委派董监高、分析师关注少和面临较高环境不确定性的企业中对会计信息可比性的影响更为显著,其作用路径主要是通过抑制管理层的代理问题,进而提升会计信息可比性。经济后果检验发现,非控股大股东退出威胁对会计信息可比性的作用提升了企业价值。本文丰富了大股东退出威胁的相关研究,也为提升企业会计信息可比性提供了新启示。

关键词: 非控股大股东, 退出威胁, 会计信息可比性