Abstract: In light of the widespread practice of “greenwashing” in businesses, this article investigates the impact of joint ownership by institutions of various types on the “greenwashing” behavior of businesses using data from listed companies from 2010 to 2020. It is found that joint ownership by non-green institutions has a conspiratorial effect and exacerbates the “greenwashing” behavior of businesses, whereas joint ownership by green institutions has a synergistic governance effect and restrains this conduct. The conclusion is still valid with the robustness test with the application of PSM and the instrumental variable method. Additional research demonstrates that while joint shareholding among green institutions may prevent “greenwashing” conduct by appointing management members, joint shareholding among non-green institutions will increase the degree of “greenwashing” through anti-competition mechanisms. The collusion effect of non-green institutions can be restrained and the synergistic effect of green institutions' holdings can be promoted while command-type environmental control and media monitoring are in place. The research on joint ownership of heterogeneous institutions is improved by this paper, which also offers a fresh explanation for the “greenwashing” phenomenon currently plaguing the Chinese market. The regulatory authorities can use this paper as a guide to enhance the environmental information disclosure system and encourage businesses to be “consistent in their words and deeds”.

Key words: “Greenwashing” Behavior, Heterogeneous Institutional Co-ownership, Collusion Fraud, Synergy Governance

摘要： 针对企业屡见不鲜的“漂绿”现象,本文基于2010—2020年上市公司数据,探究了不同性质的机构共同持股对企业“漂绿”行为的影响效应。研究发现,非绿色机构共同持股发挥合谋舞弊效应,加剧企业的“漂绿”行为,而绿色机构共同持股发挥协同治理效应,抑制企业的“漂绿”行为。采用倾向得分匹配、工具变量法等方法进行稳健性检验后结论依然成立。进一步研究发现,非绿色机构共同持股会通过反竞争机制加剧企业的“漂绿”行为,而绿色机构共同持股则会通过委派管理层机制抑制企业的“漂绿”行为。同时,命令型环境规制和媒体监督能够抑制非绿色机构共同持股的合谋效应并促进绿色机构共同持股的协同效应。本文不仅丰富了异质机构共同持股的研究,也为当前中国市场中“漂绿”现象提供了新的解释,对监管部门完善环境信息披露制度,促进企业“言行一致”提供了参考。

关键词: “漂绿”行为, 异质机构共同持股, 合谋舞弊, 协同治理