Abstract: The debt ratio of China's state-owned enterprises has long been higher than that of other forms of ownership for a long time. Reducing the excessive debt level of state-owned enterprises is an important content of preventing and resolving major risks, which requires strengthening the governance of controlling shareholders, a key minority. This paper takes the establishment of a standardized board by a central state-owned enterprise group as a quasi-natural experiment, and tries to open the black box of the governance structure of the controlling shareholders.
By constructing a staggered DID model, this paper makes the following observations: (1) The construction of a standardized board of directors by a central state-owned enterprise group can significantly restrain the excessive debt level of the controlling listed company. (2) Mechanism testing finds that the construction of a standardized board by state-owned enterprise groups reduces the agency problem of controlling listed companies, hardens budget constraints, improves internal control levels and internal financing capabilities, thus reducing the excessive debt level of listed companies. (3) The heterogeneity test shows that the inhibitory effect of the standardized board of the central state-owned enterprise group on the excessive debt of listed companies is affected by the proportion of outside directors of the standardized board, the absence degree of the owners of the central state-owned enterprise group and the control strength of the central state-owned enterprise group on listed companies. Based on the perspective of controlling shareholders' board, this paper answers the question of how the change of the controlling shareholders' governance structure affects the governance effect of listed companies, and also contributes to the research on the reform of state-owned enterprises and the construction of the board of directors.

Key words: Controlling Shareholders, Excessive Debt, Central Enterprise Group, Board Reform of Central State-owned Enterprises

摘要： 中国国有企业的负债率长期高于其他所有制形式企业,降低国有企业过度负债水平是防范化解重大风险的重要内容,需要强化控股股东这一关键少数的治理。本文以央企集团建设规范董事会为准自然实验,尝试打开控股股东治理结构的黑箱,通过构建多时点DID模型研究发现,央企集团建设规范董事会能够显著抑制控股上市公司的过度负债水平。机制检验发现,央企集团建设规范董事会降低了控股上市公司的代理问题、硬化了预算约束、提升了内部控制水平和内源融资能力,进而降低了上市公司过度负债水平。异质性检验发现,央企集团建设规范董事会对上市公司过度负债的抑制作用会受到规范董事会外部董事比重、央企集团所有者缺位程度以及央企集团对上市公司管控力度的影响。本文基于控股股东董事会的视角回答了控股股东治理结构变化如何影响上市公司治理效果的问题,对国有企业改革、董事会建设等方面的研究亦有所贡献。

关键词: 控股股东, 过度负债, 央企集团, 规范董事会