Abstract: Based on the data of listed companies that implemented cross-border M&As from 2012 to 2019, the paper uses the propensity-score matching approach and the difference-in-differences estimation method to study the impact of cross-border M&As on executive compensation, its influenc emechanism and heterogeneities. The results show that cross-border M&As have significantly increased the executive compensation of Chinese listed companies, and they still play a role in the third year after M&As. Further analysis finds that cross-border M&As can increase executive compensation through both market channels and non-market channels. In terms of market channels, cross-border M&As allow executives with overseas experience to receive higher salaries. In terms of non-market channels, cross-border M&As enable executives with more power to earn more and increase the excessive compensation of executives. This paper clarifies the mechanism of cross-border M&As affecting executive compensation, which not only has a certain reference significance for the management of corporate executive compensation under the background of the “One Belt and One Road”, but also provides useful enlightenment for the further practice of Chinese companies “going global”.

Key words: Cross-border M&As, Executive Compensation, Overseas Experience, Managerial Power, Excessive Compensation

摘要： 本文使用2012—2019年实施跨境并购的上市企业数据,结合倾向得分匹配法和双重差分法,考察跨境并购对高管薪酬的实际影响、作用机制与差异化特征。结果表明,跨境并购显著提升了中国上市企业高管薪酬,且在并购后第3年仍然发挥作用。进一步研究发现,跨境并购对高管薪酬的影响兼具相对合理的市场渠道和不合理的非市场渠道。市场渠道表现为跨境并购能让有海外经历的高管获取更高的薪酬;非市场渠道包括跨境并购使得权力更大的高管获得更高的薪酬以及跨境并购增加了高管的超额薪酬。本文厘清了中国上市企业跨境并购影响高管薪酬的作用渠道,不仅对“一带一路”倡议背景下企业高管薪酬激励具有一定参考意义,而且为中国企业“走出去”的进一步实践提供有益的启示。

关键词: 跨境并购, 高管薪酬, 海外经历, 高管权力, 超额薪酬