Abstract: Using manually collected biographical data of chairmen in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study systematically examines the impact of chairman appointment mechanisms on the dynamic adjustment of investment and financing maturity structures. The findings reveal that, compared to externally transferred chairmen, internally promoted chairmen significantly enhance the sensitivity of long-term investments to short-term debt by optimizing creditors' information screening efficiency and strengthening management's risk-taking incentives. Motivation tests indicate that this heightened sensitivity essentially results from internally promoted chairmen actively implementing debt cost management strategies. Further analysis demonstrates that strengthening external supervision and improving internal controls can effectively mitigate the sensitivity-enhancing effect associated with internally promoted chairmen. This research provides a novel perspective on dynamic financial decision-making for studying the economic consequences of SOE chairman appointment mechanisms, while offering empirical evidence for improving leadership team development in SOEs and optimizing their appointment systems with corresponding oversight mechanisms.

Key words: State-owned Enterprises, Appointment Mechanism of Chairman of the Board, Maturity Management of Investment and Financing, Information Asymmetry, Risk Preference

摘要： 借助手工收集的国有企业董事长履历数据,本文系统考察了董事长选拔机制对投融资期限结构动态调整的影响。研究发现,相较于外部调任董事长,内部选拔董事长通过优化债权人信息甄别效率、强化管理层风险承担意愿,显著提升了企业长期投资对短期债务的敏感性。通过动机检验发现,这种敏感性增强本质上是内部选拔董事长主动实施债务成本管理策略的结果。进一步分析表明,强化外部监督和完善内部控制能有效抑制内部选拔董事长的敏感性增强效应。本文为国有企业董事长选拔机制的经济后果研究提供了动态财务决策这一全新视角,更为完善国有企业领导梯队建设、优化选任制度与配套监督体系提供了实证依据。

关键词: 国有企业, 董事长选拔方式, 投融资期限管理, 信息不对称, 风险偏好