Abstract: How to give full play to the core function of state-owned capital to promote common prosperity is an urgent research issue in deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and promoting the development of private enterprises. Based on the principle of the unity of efficiency and fairness, this paper selects the private listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2007 to 2023 as the research samples, and explores the common prosperity effect of the state-owned equity participation in private enterprises from the perspective of narrowing the pay gap on the basis of guaranteeing the effectiveness of the pay contract. The study finds that state-owned equity participation can reduce the internal pay gap of private enterprises on the basis of ensuring the effectiveness of the pay contract, thus contributing to common prosperity. Mechanism tests show that state-funded equity participation mainly realizes the above effects through strengthening the value recognition effect and playing the monitoring and governance effect. Research based on pay and performance decomposition shows that state-funded equity participation narrows the internal pay gap in private enterprises by reducing the excess pay gap, ensures the effectiveness of the pay contract by improving the performance sensitivity of the pay capacity, and it will not lead to the problem of substitutionary transfer of hidden pay such as on-the-job consumption. The extended study finds that state-owned equity participation suppresses the sticky pay gap between executives and ordinary employees in private enterprises, which is a “win-win” initiative to realize the fairness of the results and rules of enterprise income distribution. The findings of the study are instructive for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, giving full play to the core function of state-owned enterprises in promoting common prosperity, and stimulating the enthusiasm of private enterprises in contributing to common prosperity.

Key words: Mixed Ownership Reform, State-Owned Capital Participation, Internal Pay Gap, Pay Performance Sensitivity, Common Prosperity

摘要： 如何充分发挥国有资本促进共同富裕的核心功能是当前深化国企改革,促进民企发展亟需研究的重要问题。本文选取2007—2023年沪深A股的民营上市公司为研究样本,依据效率与公平相统一原则,从保证薪酬契约有效性基础上缩小薪酬差距的视角,探究国有资本参股民企的共同富裕效应。研究发现,国有资本参股能够在保证薪酬契约有效性的基础上缩小民营企业的内部薪酬差距,进而助力共同富裕。机制检验显示,国有资本参股主要通过强化价值认同效应和发挥监督治理效应实现上述效果。基于薪酬、业绩分解的研究表明,国有资本参股缩小民企内部薪酬差距源于超额薪酬差距的缩小,保证薪酬契约有效性源于薪酬能力业绩敏感性的提高,并且不会引发在职消费等隐性薪酬的替代性转移问题。拓展性研究发现,国有资本参股抑制了民企高管与普通员工之间的薪酬粘性差距,是实现企业收入分配结果公平与规则公平的“双赢”举措。研究结论对于深化国企改革,充分发挥国有资本促进共同富裕的核心功能,激发民营企业助力共同富裕的积极性,具有启示意义。

关键词: 混合所有制改革, 国有资本参股, 内部薪酬差距, 薪酬业绩敏感性, 共同富裕