An Empirical Study on the Effectiveness of Prudential Supervision   ——From the Perspective of Bank Efficiency and Risks

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the micro data of 18 commercial banks of China from 2007 to 2013, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between prudential supervision tools and the bank efficiency and risks. The results are as follows: Higher capital adequacy ratio will reduce the cost efficiency and profit efficiency of banks while reducing credit risks of banks; increasing provision coverage is conducive to reduce credit risks of banks, but it will significantly improve the cost efficiency of banks; supervision of loan-to-deposit ratio cannot reduce credit risks or operating risks of banks, but to obviously increase the cost efficiency and the profit efficiency; the influence of liquidity ratio on bank risks and efficiency is not significant. All of these conclusions show that the influence of different prudential supervision tools on bank risks and efficiency is different. Some prudential supervision tools will lower banking efficiency while reducing bank risks, and therefore the objective of prudential supervision faces a trade-off between efficiency and risks.

Key words: Prudential Supervision, Bank Efficiency, Bank Risk

摘要： 基于2007~2013年我国商业银行面板数据,检验审慎监管指标与银行效率和风险的关系,从银行发展的视角对审慎监管有效性进行实证分析。研究发现;较高的资本充足率在降低银行信贷风险的同时,也导致其成本效率和利润效率下降;拨备覆盖率的增加有利于降低银行信贷风险,但却显著地提高了银行成本效率;存贷比监管不仅不能降低银行信贷风险和经营风险,还显著地增加了银行成本效率和利润效率,流动性比率对银行风险和银行效率的影响均不显著。这些结论表明,不同审慎监管工具对银行风险和效率的影响存在差别,部分审慎监管工具在降低银行风险的同时,也降低了银行效率,审慎监管的目标在效率和风险之间存在一定的取舍。

关键词: 审慎监管, 银行效率, 银行风险

CLC Number:

F832.2

SHAO Hanhua. An Empirical Study on the Effectiveness of Prudential Supervision ——From the Perspective of Bank Efficiency and Risks[J]. , 2017, 33(6): 60-68.

邵汉华. 审慎监管有效性的实证研究——基于银行效率和风险的视角[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(6): 60-68.

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An Empirical Study on the Effectiveness of Prudential Supervision ——From the Perspective of Bank Efficiency and Risks

审慎监管有效性的实证研究——基于银行效率和风险的视角

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