›› 2021, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (6): 67-77.

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Does the Involvement of Party Organizations in Corporate Governance Inhibit the Tone Manipulation of Annual Reports?

BAO Xiaojing, LI Yachao   

  1. Business School, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2020-09-16 Online:2021-06-10 Published:2021-06-03

党组织参与公司治理是否抑制了年报语调操纵行为?

鲍晓静, 李亚超   

  1. 南京大学商学院,江苏 南京 210093
  • 通讯作者: 李亚超(1994-),男,河南洛阳人,南京大学商学院博士生,通讯作者。
  • 作者简介:鲍晓静(1991-),女,山东烟台人,南京大学商学院博士生
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(20BJL032);江苏省研究生科研创新项目(KYCX20_0051)

Abstract: Taking China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as the research object, this paper empirically tests the inhibitory effect of party organizations' participation in governance on the tone manipulation of listed companies' annual reports. The study finds that the participation of party organizations in corporate governance effectively suppresses the tone manipulation of annual reports, and agency costs plays an intermediary role in the relationship between party organizations' participation in governance and the tone manipulation of annual reports of listed companies. In addition, the group inspection results based on the nature of enterprises show that the party organization's participation in the governance of the board of supervisors has a more significant inhibitory effect on the tone manipulation of the annual report in the sample of state-owned enterprises, but the party organization's participation in the governance of the board of directors does not show a difference in the nature of property rights. Further research shows that in the case of high market investor sentiment index and greater economic policy uncertainty, the governance effect of party organizations' participation in governance on the tone manipulation of listed companies' annual reports is more significant.

Key words: Party Organization Participation in Governance, Annual Report Tone Management, Agency Cost, Mediation Effect

摘要: 以2008~2018年的中国A股上市公司为研究对象,检验党组织嵌入对上市公司年报文本信息披露决策的治理效应。研究发现:党组织参与公司治理有效抑制了年报语调操纵,且代理成本在企业党组织对年报语调操纵的治理效应中起到部分中介效应。此外,基于企业性质的分组检验结果表明,党组织参与监事会治理对年报语调操纵的抑制作用在国有企业样本更为显著,但党组织参与董事会治理未表现出产权性质差异。进一步研究表明,在市场投资者情绪指数较高以及经济政策不确定性较大的情况下,党组织参与治理对上市公司年报语调操纵的治理效应更为显著。

关键词: 党组织参与治理, 年报语调操纵, 代理成本, 中介效应

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