Abstract: With its focus on the issue that “industry policy must be targeted”, this paper studies the association between the implementation of the industry policy and the capital market information risk. Using“high-tech enterprises”recognition as an important micro-level implementation mechanism of the industrial policy, it finds that gaining the “high-tech enterprises”recognition significantly reduces stock price crash risks. Further analysis indicates the passage of the “high-tech enterprises”recognition leads to higher earning quality and earning reliability, less stock price co-movement, more accurate financial analyst's earning forecasts and finally higher corporate valuation. The study, from the perspective of industry policy implementation, explains the formation mechanisms of listed firms' stock crash risk and discloses that national macroeconomic policy plays a role in turning around information infidelity or distortion at firm-level. These findings provide important implications for understanding mechanisms on the relation between political factors and information risks in the capital market valuation.

Key words: Industrial Policy, High-tech Enterprises Recognition, Stock Price Crash Risk, Information Risk

摘要： 文章聚焦于“产业政策要准”这一核心问题,分析了我国高科技产业政策微观实施与资本市场信息风险的关系。文章将“高新技术企业”资质认定视为实施高科技产业政策的重要机制,研究发现获得“高新技术企业”资质认定的企业其股价崩盘风险显著降低。围绕两者间的实现机制及其价值效应,文章进一步拓展研究发现,获得“高新技术企业”资质认定后企业盈利操纵性部分显著减少,盈利稳定性更高,股价波动同步性程度更低,证券分析师盈利预测更精准,企业价值显著提升。文章从我国产业政策微观实施的视角,解释了上市企业股价崩盘风险的形成机制,表明国家宏观政策的微观实施具有抑制信息“失真”和信息“扭曲”的作用,对从产业政策执行视角厘清政治因素与资本市场信息风险定价的形成途径具有借鉴价值。

关键词: 产业政策, 高新技术企业认定, 股价崩盘风险, 信息风险