Abstract: Based on the RPM collusion model, we shows that minimum resale price restriction collectively by Moutai and Wuliangye is an mechanism of facilitating collusion. As first antitrust case on resale price maintenance, enforcement should confirm the rule of reason, afford firms defend opportunities, ensure the basis of penalty level and strengthen the enforcement capacity of the antitrust agency.

摘要： 本文针对茅台、五粮液转售价格维持案，构建了转售价格维持促进合谋的理论模型，分析显示茅台、五粮液的最低转售价格维持具有承诺维持高价和促进合谋协议实施的效应，是企业之间默契合谋的机制，应该受到《反垄断法》的禁止。中国最低转售价格维持的反垄断执法原则、效率抗辩、罚金水平等都需改进。