关键词: 退出威胁, “铁公鸡”, 现金分红, 治理机制

Abstract: This paper explores the role played by the exit threatening of large shareholder's “voting with their feet” in curbing “Iron Rooster” listed companies' non-dividend payout behaviors. It also examines the distinctive features of this relationship by combining the company's internal and external governance mechanisms. The result shows that exit threatening of large shareholders curbs “Iron Rooster” listed companies' non-dividend payout behavior. Furthermore, when corporate internal governance is relatively rough, or in other words, the higher the shareholding percentage of controlling shareholder, the lower the ratio of large shareholder's holding compared with controlling shareholder's holding, the more significant the curbing effect is. When the corporate external governance is relatively rough, that is to say, the lower the quality of the external auditing, the more significant the cubing effect is. The conclusions are still valid after many robustness tests and alternative explanations.

Key words: Exit Threatening, “Iron Roosters”, Cash Dividends, Governance Mechanism