Abstract: Based on the assumption that the more the private benefit of control the higher the possibility that the entrepreneur retains the control when the firm goes public, the paper attempts to investigate the relationship between political connection of private listed company and the family involvement in the board of director. The paper argues that, political connection can increase the pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefit of control and decrease the possibilities that the controlling shareholder is punished by the regulatory institution and capital market due to the tunneling. As a result, the higher the rank of political connection of the controller of private listed company, the larger the private benefit of control and the more family involvement in board of directors. The empirical result brings about the evidence which supports the above argument. The political connection of private listed company has a positive correlation with the involvement in board of directors by family members, the high the rank of political connection the final controller of private listed company, the high degree the family members involve in board of directors. Keywords: Political connection, private benefit of control, family involvement, private listed company