Abstract: his paper examines earnings management behavior of the listed A-Stock firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period of CEO turnover, and the effect brought by different successor origin on earnings management. We find that CEO turnover and its successor origin have a significant effect on earnings management behavior. Specifically, our results contains four aspects, including: (1)Earnings management exists during the year of CEO turnover and next year, the firms of CEO turnover usually reduced profits through earnings management in the year of turnover, and then increase profit to meet the level of the previous year. (2)Compared to inside successors, outside successors make more negative earnings management in the year of turnover, while insider successors make more positive earnings management in next year. (3) The policy of earnings management is similar between successors from major shareholders and from firm inside. We do not find their earnings management significant differences in the year of turnover and next year. (4)However, the policy of earnings management is different between successors from manager market and from firm inside. The earnings management of the former in the year of turnover is more affected by last year, earnings management of the former in next year is less than that of the other two successors.