财经论丛 ›› 2016, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 97-104.

• 政府管制 • 上一篇    下一篇

纵向分拆与价格规制对中国发电企业效率的影响

张雷,乐军   

  1. 浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院
  • 收稿日期:2015-09-05 修回日期:2015-12-06 出版日期:2016-02-10 发布日期:2016-03-04
  • 通讯作者: 张雷
  • 基金资助:

    买方垄断下的接入歧视与规制研究;买方垄断市场中接入歧视的监测与规制

Effects of Vertical Unbundling and Price Regulation on the Performance of Power Generation Enterprises in China

  • Received:2015-09-05 Revised:2015-12-06 Online:2016-02-10 Published:2016-03-04

摘要: 如何激励电力企业改进生产效率一直是电力行业改革的核心问题。本文实证测度1999-2009年间我国数百家火力发电企业年度TFP,显示2002年厂网分拆之后,火力发电企业TFP的增速较之前有明显提升,表明市场化改革确实对发电企业生产效率的改进起到促进作用,但是通过销售电价与发电企业TFP回归分析发现,销售电价下降对发电企业TFP有明显的激励作用,而销售电价上升对发电企业TFP并无影响,即存在非对称性激励,表明销售电价的变化信号被选择性地向上游传递,仅规制销售电价可能并不会促进输配电企业改进生产效率,但发电企业受到规制转嫁的风险却确定性地增加了。

Abstract: How to motivate power enterprises to improve productivity has always been the core issue of power industry reforms. Through empirical analysis, this paper has measured the annual TFP of hundreds of domestic thermal power enterprises. The results show that thermal power enterprises have enjoyed a significant boost of TFP since the separation of power generation and transmission in 2002. However, based on the regression analysis between sales price of electricity and the TFP of power generation enterprises, we find that the TFP is promoted when the sales price falls, but nothing happens to the TFP when the sales price increases. That is to say, there exists asymmetric incentives. This further suggests that changes in sales price are selectively transferred upstream, the regulation of sales price alone would not encourage the transmission and distribution enterprises to improve productivity. However, power generation enterprises are subject to increased risks of regulation transference.

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