Abstract: Using data of listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges with non-current asset disposal gains and losses in the period 2007-2014， the paper means to analyze the earnings management motivation of non-current assets disposal and the control effect of board of directors on earnings management. The results of the study show :(1) the listed companies will make use of the disposal of non-current assets to turn loss into profit in current profit-loss year, and if they cannot turn loss into profit in current profit-loss year, the listed companies will delay the disposal until the future year when required, then they will be engaged in the great purge of earning management behavior of non-current assets. (2) in board of directors mechanism, earning management is indistinctively negatively associated with the board size，there are significant negative relationship between the general manager duality, the proportion of independent directors and earnings management. (3) compared with the private listed company, state-owned enterprises are more inclined to choose real earnings management for earnings manipulation．the general manager duality and the proportion of independent directors of the state-owned listed corporation is more perfect, and board meeting of private listed company is more perfect..