较差的行业环境会导致更多的CEO被变更吗？——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (2): 76-84.

较差的行业环境会导致更多的CEO被变更吗？——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

胡刘芬, 周泽将

安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥 230601

收稿日期:2016-04-12 出版日期:2017-02-10 发布日期:2017-02-10
作者简介:胡刘芬(1987-),女,安徽安庆人,安徽大学商学院讲师,博士; 周泽将(1983-),男,安徽安庆人,安徽大学商学院副教授,博士
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502001; 71302113); 安徽省高校人文社科基金资助项目(SK2015A233)

Will Poorer Industrial Environment Cause More CEOs to be Replaced?——Based on the Empirical Evidence of A-share Public Companies in China

HU Liufen, ZHOU Zejiang

School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China

Received:2016-04-12 Online:2017-02-10 Published:2017-02-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以2004~2014年在沪、深两市交易的A股公司为研究样本,实证检验了行业环境对我国上市公司CEO变更决策的影响。研究结论显示:外部行业环境引起的企业绩效越差,CEO被非自愿变更的可能性越大。结合我国特殊的制度背景进一步探讨了不同所有权性质以及制度环境下CEO变更决策的差异性,结果表明:与非国有企业相比,国有企业CEO变更决策更可能受到外部行业环境的影响,较好的制度环境有助于降低行业环境对国有企业CEO变更的影响程度。

关键词: 行业环境, CEO变更, 所有权性质, 制度环境

Abstract: This research studies the effect of industrial environment on CEOs' turnover,using data of A-Share public companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in the period 2004-2014 as samples. It is foundthat the worse the industrial environmentis,the more likely CEOs are to be involuntarily changed. This paper further discusses the differences in the decision-making of CEO turnover in different ownerships and institutional environment. The result shows that compared withnon-state-owned enterprises,CEO turnover decisions of state-owned enterprises are more likely to be influenced by external industrial environment. Better institutional environment will help to reduce the impact of industrial environment on CEO turnover in state-owned enterprises.The paper expands the research in the field of management change and provides incremental empirical evidence for the decision-making of CEOsturnover in Chinese listed companies.

Key words: Industry Environment, CEO Turnover, Ownership, Institutional Environment

中图分类号:

F276.6

胡刘芬, 周泽将. 较差的行业环境会导致更多的CEO被变更吗？——基于A股上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(2): 76-84.

HU Liufen, ZHOU Zejiang. Will Poorer Industrial Environment Cause More CEOs to be Replaced?——Based on the Empirical Evidence of A-share Public Companies in China[J]. , 2017, 33(2): 76-84.

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