地方财政在雾霾污染防治中的社会回应性评价

财经论丛 ›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (1): 21-29.

地方财政在雾霾污染防治中的社会回应性评价

马海涛¹, 刘燕², 师玉朋³

1.中央财经大学研究生院,北京 100081;
2.中央财经大学政府管理学院,北京 100081;
3.中船重工军民融合与国防动员发展研究中心,北京 100192

收稿日期:2017-05-22 出版日期:2018-01-10 发布日期:2018-01-10
作者简介:马海涛(1966-),男,山东威海人,中央财经大学研究生院教授,博士生导师;刘燕(1977-),女,山东荣成人,中央财经大学政府管理学院讲师,博士;师玉朋(1987-),男,山西运城人,中船重工军民融合与国防动员发展研究中心工程师,博士。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重点项目(15AZZ010);北京市哲学社会科学规划重点项目(15FXA002)

Social Responsibility Evaluation of Local Finance in the Prevention and Control of Haze Pollution

MA Haitao¹, LIU Yan², SHI Yupeng³

1.Granduate School,Gentral University of Finance and Economics;
2.School of Government Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081,China;
3.Research Center of Civil Military Integration and National Defense Mobilization Development of CSIC, Beijing 100192,China

Received:2017-05-22 Online:2018-01-10 Published:2018-01-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 雾霾污染防治的内在财政机制是地方财政节能环保支出规模及占比与PM_2.5正相关。根据环境库兹涅茨曲线特征,采用人均GDP作为门限变量,构建非线性模型对中国地方财政在雾霾防治中的社会回应性进行检验。结果表明,随着经济水平提升,地方官员对雾霾防治工作的态度经历了容忍、忽视、关注和重视四种特征。根据城市功能和发展定位不同,相对于行政中心城市,激励不完备导致非行政中心城市官员在雾霾治理方面存在政府失灵现象;环保模范城市门槛效应不明显,而非环保模范城市只有在人均GDP大于3.06时才会逐渐加大污染治理投资比例。研究结果表明地方政府在雾霾防治中存在异质性动机,财政的社会回应性表现不足,依据经济发展阶段制定与之相适应的激励约束机制是防治雾霾污染的首要条件。

关键词: 环保投入, 雾霾污染, 财政回应性, 门槛效应

Abstract: The internal financial mechanism of haze pollution control is that the scale and proportion of local fiscal energy saving and environmental protection expenditureis positively related to PM2.5.According to the characteristics of environmental Kuznets curve,using per capita GDP as a threshold variable,we construct a non-linear model to test the responsiveness of local finance in haze control.The results show that,with the improvement of economic level,local officials' attitude towards haze prevention has experienced four characteristics of tolerance, neglect, showing concern and paying greatattention. According to the function and development orientation, compared to the administrative center cities, due to imperfect incentives, non-administrative center city officials have government failure phenomenon in the haze management. The threshold effect is not obvious in environmental protection exemplary city. And only when the per capita GDP is greater than 3.06willthe non-environmental protection exemplary cities gradually increase the proportion of pollution control investment. These findings indicate that the local governmentshave heterogeneous motivation in the hazecontrol andtheir social responsibility is inadequate. Thus, thedevelopment of appropriate incentive and restraint mechanismaccording to the economic development stage is the primary conditions in control haze pollution.

Key words: Environmental Protection Investment, Haze Pollution, the Responsiveness of Local Government, Threshold Effect

中图分类号:

F812.7

马海涛, 刘燕, 师玉朋. 地方财政在雾霾污染防治中的社会回应性评价[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(1): 21-29.

MA Haitao, LIU Yan, SHI Yupeng. Social Responsibility Evaluation of Local Finance in the Prevention and Control of Haze Pollution[J]. , 2018, 34(1): 21-29.

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