关键词: 专业研发企业, 拒绝许可, 策略激励, 竞争效应, 反垄断政策

Abstract: Refusal to Licensing is a controversial issue in antimonopoly law legislation and enforcement. This paper concentrates on clarifying strategic motivies and competition effects of refusal to Licensing. The results demonstrate that the specialist patent holder has no incentives to refuse licensing. When the implimenter has the ability to enter patent market by follow-on innovation, the specialist patent holder has stronger incentives to refuse licensing in order to foreclose potential competitors. In this scenario, refusal to licensing impedes innovation and harms dynamic efficiency, which should be prohibited by Antimonopoly law. The antimonopoly review of refusal to licensing by patent holder whose patent constitutes essential facility should pay much attention to innovation effects by applying innovative market foreclosure theory.

Key words: Spacialist Patentee, Refusal to Licensing, Strategic Motives, Competition Effects, Antimonopoly