关键词: 合约实施制度, 完全合约, 不完全合约

Abstract: This paper makes a comparison of two different methodologies of dealing with the contract enforcement problem, i.e., the incomplete contract theory and the complete contract theory. The theory of incomplete contract recognizes that asset specificity and the quality of contract enforcement work together to determine the extent of efficiency distortion. As long as the contract is incompletely enforced, there will be efficiency distortion. However, the complete contract theory emphasizes that the incomplete enforcement is the combined consequence of agent's type and the quality of contract enforcement. The efficiency of contract enforcement itself will not necessarily result in efficiency distortion. The comparison of ex ante contract social surplus indicates that the implication of contract enforcement will positively affect social welfare. Although these two analytical frameworks choose different references and focuses, the basic conclusion is consistent, that is, with the improvement of contract enforcement, the extent of efficiency distortion will be relieved.

Key words: Contract Enforcement, Institution, Complete Contract, Incomplete Contract