地方政府文化财政支出竞争与空间溢出效应——基于空间计量模型的实证研究

财经论丛 ›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (6): 12-23.

地方政府文化财政支出竞争与空间溢出效应——基于空间计量模型的实证研究

贺达, 顾江

南京大学商学院,江苏南京 210093

收稿日期:2017-06-16 出版日期:2018-06-10 发布日期:2018-06-05
作者简介:贺达(1992-),女,安徽滁州人,南京大学商学院博士生;顾江(1965-),男,江苏南京人,南京大学商学院教授。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71373119)

Cultural Financial Expenditure Competition among Local Governments and Its Spatial Spillover Effect—— An Empirical Study Based on the Spatial Econometric Model

HE Da, GU Jiang

School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China

Received:2017-06-16 Online:2018-06-10 Published:2018-06-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文基于效用最优化模型假定地方政府在文化财政支出上存在相互竞争,搭便车和相互独立三种可能行为;运用我国2004～2014年31个省市的面板数据,构建5类空间权重矩阵,通过SAC空间计量模型,实证检验我国地方政府间文化财政支出的策略性行为及其空间溢出效应。研究发现:我国各地方政府间文化财政支出显著表现为相互竞争行为;其中财政分权程度、人口密度和地区经济状况有较高的正向空间溢出效应,地区文化产业发展情况和城镇化水平的空间溢出效应为负。

关键词: 文化财政支出, 策略性行为, 地方政府间竞争, 空间溢出效应

Abstract: Based on the optimization model, this paper assumes that there are 3 kinds of strategic interaction of cultural fiscal expenditure among local governments, they are the competition behavior, the free riding behavior and the independence behavior. It then uses the panel data of 31 provinces from 2004 to 2014 to build five types of spatial weight matrix, and empirically test the spatial spillover effects of cultural fiscal expenditure in China throughthe SAC spatial econometric model. Results show that the strategic behavior of local governments in China is complementary, which means the cultural fiscal expenditure among local governments is competing with each other. The degree of fiscal decentralization, population density and regional economic condition have higher positive spatial spillover effects; while spatial spillover effects caused by regional cultural industry development situation and the urbanization are negative.

Key words: Cultural Fiscal Expenditure, Strategic Behavior, Local Governments' Competition, Spatial Spillover Effect

中图分类号:

F812.45

贺达, 顾江. 地方政府文化财政支出竞争与空间溢出效应——基于空间计量模型的实证研究[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(6): 12-23.

HE Da, GU Jiang. Cultural Financial Expenditure Competition among Local Governments and Its Spatial Spillover Effect—— An Empirical Study Based on the Spatial Econometric Model[J]. , 2018, 34(6): 12-23.

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