关键词: 股权质押, 分析师独立性, 公司信息透明度, 分析师声誉

Abstract: Securities analysts arean information intermediary between investors and listed companies. Their task is to provide investors with useful information for decision-making and reduce the degree of information asymmetry between investors and listed companies, but the interference of other interests has made the issue of analyst independence controversial. With the expansion of China's equity pledge business, the “credit-debtor” interest relationship between brokers and companies has seriously affected the independence of brokers' analysts. The study finds that if brokerage company has equity pledge business with listed companies, the analysts of the brokerage company will be more optimistic about the company's investment rating, which will reduce analysts' independence. Further research finds that this phenomenon is more serious if the company's information transparency is low, or if the analyst's personal reputation is low. The above conclusions are still robust after DID+PSM is used to control endogeneity problems and other robustness testsare conducted. The findings of this paper have certain reference value for regulating the analyst industry, perfecting the equity pledge policy and improving the efficiency of the capital market.

Key words: Equity Pledge, Analyst Independence, Corporate Information Transparency, Analyst Reputation Mechanism