县级政府间教育支出的策略互动:标尺竞争机制识别

财经论丛 ›› 2020, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (4): 33-42.

县级政府间教育支出的策略互动:标尺竞争机制识别

宗晓华¹, 丁建福², 徐永辰³

1.南京大学教育研究院,江苏南京 210093;
2.浙江财经大学财政税务学院,浙江杭州 310018;
3.上海财经大学经济学院,上海 200082)

收稿日期:2019-06-28 出版日期:2020-04-10 发布日期:2020-04-28
通讯作者: 丁建福(1980-),男,江西抚州人,浙江财经大学财政税务学院副教授。
作者简介:宗晓华(1982-),男,河南平顶山人,南京大学教育研究院副研究员;
徐永辰(1988-),男,浙江杭州人,上海财经大学经济学院博士生。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金教育学青年课题(CFA150157)

Strategic Interaction in Educational Spending across China's Counties:Identification of Yardstick Competition

ZONG Xiaohua¹, DING Jianfu², XU Yongchen³

1.Institute of Education, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China;
2.School of Public Fiance and Taxation, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China;
3.School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, 200082

Received:2019-06-28 Online:2020-04-10 Published:2020-04-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文在梳理标尺竞争机制识别潜在干扰性因素的基础上,通过对干扰性因素进行控制,并借助竞争者数量、换届周期、4%任务期三个外生政治因素构建识别策略,对教育支出标尺竞争机制进行识别。利用2007~2011年县级义务教育支出面板数据进行实证检验,发现标尺竞争是县级政府间教育支出策略互动的主要原因。本文的边际贡献在于:一是在多级政府结构中考虑了潜在的干扰性机制和因素;二是结合制度背景识别出教育支出的标尺竞争机制。

关键词: 教育支出, 策略互动, 标尺竞争

Abstract: This paper gives a full list of disturbing factors for the identification of the yardstick competition. The yardstick competition in educational service is identified with controlling the disturbing factors and by adopting empirical strategies based on the competitor size, the political cycle and the 4% task period. Using the county panel data of the compulsory educational spending in 2007~2011, this research shows that the strategic interaction across counties is mainly driven by the yardstick competition. The marginal contributions are as follows: (1) the consideration of all possible disturbing factors in multi-tiered government structure, and (2) the identification of the yardstick competition in the provision of local education in the context of certain institutions.

Key words: Educational Spending, Strategic Interaction, Yardstick Competition

中图分类号:

F812.7

宗晓华, 丁建福, 徐永辰. 县级政府间教育支出的策略互动:标尺竞争机制识别[J]. 财经论丛, 2020, 36(4): 33-42.

ZONG Xiaohua, DING Jianfu, XU Yongchen. Strategic Interaction in Educational Spending across China's Counties:Identification of Yardstick Competition[J]. , 2020, 36(4): 33-42.

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