关键词: 官员任期, 实际税负, 政企合谋

Abstract:

As global economic uncertainty increases and China’s economy enters the stage of “new normal”, tax reduction and fee reduction for enterprises and increasing the vitality of the real economy have become the focus of the economic work. Using dynamic collusion theory, this paper provides a new perspective for understanding the effective tax rate of Chinese enterprises. Firstly, this paper uses the basic idea of the relational contract to extend the traditional collusion theory to a dynamic form. In equilibrium, with the increase of the tenure of local government officials, the collusion between the local government and enterprises also increases. Secondly, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between the officials’ tenure and the effective tax rate of enterprises by using data from the Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database from 1998 to 2013 and the data of municipal Party secretaries of prefecture-level cities in China from 1998 to 2013. The longer the tenure of the municipal Party secretary is, the lower the effective tax rate will be. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance for the further promotion of tax reduction and fee reduction for enterprises in China.

Key words: Officials’ Tenure, Effective Tax Rate, Collusion