审计师行业专长能够降低公司被监管问询的概率吗——基于年报问询函的证据

财经论丛 ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (11): 81-91.

审计师行业专长能够降低公司被监管问询的概率吗——基于年报问询函的证据

郝晓敏, 王永海

武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉 430072

收稿日期:2021-10-29 出版日期:2022-11-10 发布日期:2022-11-22
作者简介:郝晓敏(1992—),女,山西平遥人,武汉大学经济与管理学院博士生;王永海(1965—),男,湖北随州人,武汉大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师。
基金资助:
教育部哲学社会科学重大课题攻关项目(10JZD0019);财政部“会计名家培养工程”(财政部财会〔2016〕15号)

Can Auditor Industry Expertise Reduce the Probability of A Firm Being Inquired: Evidence from Chinese Annual Report Comment Letters

HAO Xiaomin, WANG Yonghai

Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Received:2021-10-29 Online:2022-11-10 Published:2022-11-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以我国2014─2019年A股上市公司为样本,研究审计师行业专长对公司收到年报问询函概率的影响。结果表明,审计师行业专长能够降低公司收到年报问询函的概率,这一结论在考虑内生性问题和稳健性检验之后依然成立。审计师行业专长每提高一个单位,公司收到年报问询函的概率下降约13.08%。此外,审计师行业专长与公司收函概率之间的负向关系在内部治理水平较低的公司更加显著。聘用行业专长较低事务所的公司收到问询函后发生财务重述的概率更高。整体而言,审计师行业专长能够发挥外部公司治理的作用,减少公司被监管问询的概率。本文研究结论对于上市公司选择审计师类型、会计师事务所发展行业专长以及监管机构确定监管重点具有借鉴意义。

关键词: 审计师行业专长, 年报问询函, 内部治理, 财务重述

Abstract: Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2014 to 2019, this paper studies the impact of the auditor industry expertise on the probability of firms receiving annual report comment letters. The findings show that the auditor industry expertise can reduce the probability of firms receiving annual report comment letters. This conclusion still holds true after endogeneity issues are considered and a series of robustness tests are conducted. For each unit increase in the auditor industry expertise, the probability of a firm receiving an annual report comment letter decreases by approximately 13. 08%. Furthermore, the negative relationship between the auditor industry expertise and a firm's probability of receiving an annual report comment letter is more significant in firms with lower-level internal governance. Firms employing audit firms with lower-level industry expertise have a higher probability of financial restatements after receiving annual report comment letters. Overall, the auditor industry expertise can play a role in the external corporate governance and reduce the likelihood of a firm being inquired. The findings of this paper have implications for the choice of auditors by listed firms, the development of the industry expertise by audit firms and the regulatory focus of regulators.

Key words: Auditor Industry Expertise, Annual Report Comment Letters, Internal Governance, Financial Restatements

中图分类号:

F275

郝晓敏, 王永海. 审计师行业专长能够降低公司被监管问询的概率吗——基于年报问询函的证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(11): 81-91.

HAO Xiaomin, WANG Yonghai. Can Auditor Industry Expertise Reduce the Probability of A Firm Being Inquired: Evidence from Chinese Annual Report Comment Letters[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(11): 81-91.

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