控股股东股权质押与金融化投资研究——基于风险与收益的中介效应检验

财经论丛 ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (8): 49-57.

控股股东股权质押与金融化投资研究——基于风险与收益的中介效应检验

宋迪¹, 杨超²

1.中国政法大学商学院,北京 100088;
2.清华大学经济管理学院,北京 100084

收稿日期:2020-11-05 出版日期:2022-08-10 发布日期:2022-09-06
通讯作者: 宋迪(1990—),女,北京市人,中国政法大学商学院讲师,博士。
作者简介:杨超(1988—),男,河南信阳人,清华大学经济管理学院与华夏幸福产业投资有限公司联合培养博士后。
基金资助:
中国政法大学青年教师资助计划(10821706)

Research on Controlling Shareholder's Stocks Pledge and Corporate Financialization Investment: Based on the Intermediary Effect Test of Risk and Return

SONG Di¹, YANG Chao²

1. Business School, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Received:2020-11-05 Online:2022-08-10 Published:2022-09-06

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 利用2008—2017年沪深A股控股股东存在股权质押的上市公司数据,对控股股东股权质押与公司金融化投资间的关系进行探讨。研究发现:(1)控股股东股权质押比例越高,公司金融化投资规模越大;(2)控股股东存在股权质押的公司,可以通过降低经营风险或公司治理效率来提升公司的金融化投资水平;(3)控股股东存在股权质押的公司,通过提高公司金融化投资规模而降低公司实体投资水平和投资效率;(4)当行业竞争度较高、投资者保护水平较低时,控股股东股权质押比例越高,公司金融化投资规模越大。

关键词: 控股股东, 股权质押, 公司金融化, 金融化投资

Abstract: This paper uses the data of the stock pledge of controlling shareholder of China A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017 to explore the relationship between stock pledge of controlling shareholder and corporate financialization. The study found that under the same conditions, the higher the stock pledge ratio of the controlling shareholder, the larger the scale of the company's financial investment. The companies with stock pledge of controlling shareholder can increase the company's financial investment by reducing operating risks or corporate governance efficiency. Further research that the stock pledge of the controlling shareholder reduce the company's entity investment level and investment efficiency by increasing the company's financial investment scale. When the industry is more competitive and the level of investor protection is lower, the higher the stock pledge ratio of the controlling shareholder, the greater the scale of the company's financial asset investment.

Key words: Controlling Shareholder, Stocks Pledge, Corporate Financialization, Financial Investment

中图分类号:

F272

宋迪, 杨超. 控股股东股权质押与金融化投资研究——基于风险与收益的中介效应检验[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(8): 49-57.

SONG Di, YANG Chao. Research on Controlling Shareholder's Stocks Pledge and Corporate Financialization Investment: Based on the Intermediary Effect Test of Risk and Return[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(8): 49-57.

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