财政层级结构调整如何影响了纵向税收竞争关系?——来自省直管县改革的证据

财经论丛 ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (9): 35-46.

财政层级结构调整如何影响了纵向税收竞争关系?——来自省直管县改革的证据

吕凯波¹, 郑冰²

1.浙江工商大学金融学院,浙江杭州 310018;
2.浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2021-06-02 出版日期:2022-09-10 发布日期:2022-09-20
作者简介:吕凯波(1987—),男,浙江新昌人,浙江工商大学金融学院副教授;郑冰(1987—),女,浙江金华人,浙江理工大学经济管理学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题(21NDJC006Z);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71803177);浙江省自然科学基金青年项目(Q18G030013;LQ20G030029)

Has Fiscal Hierarchy Reform Affected the Vertical Intergovernmental Tax Interaction? Evidence from Province-managing-county Reform

LV Kaibo¹, ZHENG Bing²

1. School of Finance,Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou, 310018, China;
2. College of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Sci-tech University, Hangzhou, 310018, China

Received:2021-06-02 Online:2022-09-10 Published:2022-09-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 协调好上下级政府间的税收分配关系是大国财政治理的重要内容。作为一次财政层级结构扁平化的尝试,省直管县改革取消地市级财政参与县级税收分成的制度安排能够阻断税收任务的层层加码。由于分批逐步进行省直管县试点改革的模式使得财政层级结构调整具有明显的“准自然实验”特征,本文利用1628个县的面板数据模型识别财政层级设置对纵向税收竞争关系的影响。分析结果表明,省直管县改革强化了县级财政与地市级财政间的纵向税收竞争关系,但弱化了县级财政与省级财政间的纵向税收竞争关系。分省直管县改革模式和分区域估计的结果表明,上述效果主要体现在全面直管型地区和东部地区。在进一步对省直管县改革影响纵向税收竞争的机制分析中,本文发现省直管县改革能通过税收收入分配机制和转移支付机制对纵向税收竞争产生影响。

关键词: 纵向税收竞争, 省直管县, 财政层级结构

Abstract: Coordinating the vertical intergovernmental relationship is one of the kernel task of fiscal governance for a great power. Since the 2000s, China has pushed forward the province-managing-county reform in some provinces as an experiment of flat public management. To identify the asymmetrical effects of the local fiscal system reform on the vertical intergovernmental tax interaction, this paper conducts an empirical study by using a rich Chinese database which provides information on all kinds of taxes collected by 1628 counties or cities. The results show that the province-managing-county reform strengthens the tax competition between county governments and prefecture-level city governments but attenuates the tax competition between county governments and provincial governments. The grouping estimation results indicate that both counties in the overall reform and the partial reform are affected by the local fiscal system reform. It is also found that counties in the overall reform and counties in eastern areas enjoy more fruits from the fiscal system reform .

Key words: Vertical Tax Competition, Counties Directly Administrated by Province, Fiscal Hierarchy

中图分类号:

F812.2

吕凯波, 郑冰. 财政层级结构调整如何影响了纵向税收竞争关系?——来自省直管县改革的证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(9): 35-46.

LV Kaibo, ZHENG Bing. Has Fiscal Hierarchy Reform Affected the Vertical Intergovernmental Tax Interaction? Evidence from Province-managing-county Reform[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(9): 35-46.

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